Are Politicians Accountable to Voters? Evidence from U.S. House Roll Call Voting Records

To what extent is the median voter theorem empirically relevant for the political economy of the United States? We assess the empirical relevance of the median voter theorem – and quantify any departures from the theory's predictions – in the context of roll call voting patterns among members of the U.S. House of Representatives. We exploit a regression discontinuity design inherent in the electoral system in order to account for unobservable voter preferences and omitted determinants of politicians’ behavior. Our empirical results reject the most extreme form of the median voter theorem, and a surprising fact emerges: there is virtually no correlation between the liberalness of a Representative’s voting record and the Democratic vote share. The evidence on roll call votes is neither consistent with strong nor weak accountability, suggesting that evidence of politician accountability would more likely be found in analyses of different aspects of politicians’ actions. * We thank David Card and John DiNardo for helpful discussions.