Evolutionary Equilibrium in Bayesian Routing Games: Specialization and Niche Formation

In this paper we consider Nash Equilibria for the selfish routing model proposed in [12], where a set of n users with tasks of different size try to access m parallel links with different speeds. In this model, a player can use a mixed strategy (where he uses different links with a positive probability); then he is indifferent between the different link choices. This means that the player may well deviate to a different strategy over time. We propose the concept of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) as a criterion for stable Nash Equilibria, i.e. Equilibria where no player is likely to deviate from his strategy. An ESS is a steady state that can be reached by a user community via evolutionary processes in which more successful strategies spread over time. The concept has been used widely in biology and economics to analyze the dynamics of strategic interactions. We establish that the ESS is uniquely determined for a symmetric Bayesian parallel links game (when it exists). Thus evolutionary stability places strong constraints on the assignment of tasks to links.