Passive frame theory : A new synthesis ( PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE , PROOF )

Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action. R1. The nature of the problem and definitions of consciousness For decades, the question of what consciousness contributes to the functioning of the nervous system has perplexed theorists and experimentalists, leading some of the greatest scientific minds, including the Nobel laureates Leon Cooper, Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, Eric Kandel, and Charles Sherrington, to conclude that answering this question is one of the greatest puzzles in science. As Shallice (1972) asserts, “The problem of consciousness occupies an analogous position for cognitive psychology as the problem of language behavior does for behaviorism, namely, an unsolved anomaly within the domain of the approach” (p. 383). Passive frame theory (PFT), a synthesis of diverse ideas, attempts to answer this question and yield novel insights about consciousness and the brain, all within a conceptual framework that, importantly, is internally coherent (Dux, Gainotti) and comprehensive (Mudrik). PFT attempts to illuminate what consciousness contributes to nervous function, how it serves this role, and what consciousness is, at least in mechanistic, functional terms. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without it, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor function. The