THE DYNAMIC PIVOT MECHANISM BY DIRK BERGEMANN and JUUSO VÄLIMÄKI COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1293 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
نویسندگان
چکیده
1 We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the ex post incentive and ex post participation constraints are satisfied for all agents after all histories. In an environment with diverse preferences it is the unique mechanism satisfying ex post incentive, ex post participation, and efficient exit conditions. We develop the dynamic pivot mechanism in detail for a repeated auction of a single object in which each bidder learns over time her true valuation of the object. The dynamic pivot mechanism here is equivalent to a modified second price auction.
منابع مشابه
INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND EFFICIENT MECHANISM DESIGN BY DIRK BERGEMANN and JUUSO VÄLIMÄKI COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1038 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
1 We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex-post. It is shown that in every private value envir...
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