Why Do Rational People Vote in Large Elections with Costs to Vote?

نویسندگان

  • Serge Blondel
  • Louis Lévy-Garboua
چکیده

Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve this paradox of not voting and may even aggravate it. However, if the possibility of a decisive vote comes to mind, expected utility maximizers will doubt their preference for abstention and greatly overestimate the decisiveness of their own ballot. This yields a canonical rational choice solution to the paradox of not voting and, more generally, a rationale for the illusion of control governing all sorts of magical acts. JEL Classification: D72, D81

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تاریخ انتشار 2008