Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure
نویسندگان
چکیده
Properties of discrete cake-cutting procedures that use a minimal number of cuts (n – 1 if there are n players) are analyzed. None is always envy-free or efficient, but divideand-conquer (D&C) minimizes the maximum number of players that any single player may envy. It works by asking n ≥ 2 players successively to place marks on a cake that divide it into equal or approximately equal halves, then halves of these halves, and so on. Among other properties, D&C (i) ensures players of more than 1/n shares if their marks are different and (ii) is strategyproof for risk-averse players. However, D&C may not allow players to obtain proportional, connected pieces if they have unequal entitlements. Possible applications of D&C to land division are briefly discussed.
منابع مشابه
Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Algorithm
We analyze a class of proportional cake-cutting algorithms that use a minimal number of cuts (n − 1 if there are n players) to divide a cake that the players value along one dimension. While these algorithms may not produce an envy-free or efficient allocation—as these terms are used in the fair-division literature—one, divide-and-conquer (D&C), minimizes the maximum number of players that any ...
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Properties of discrete cake-cutting procedures that use a minimal number of cuts (n – 1 if there are n players) are analyzed. None is always envy-free or efficient, but divideand-conquer (D&C) minimizes the maximum number of players that any single player may envy. It works by asking n ≥ 2 players successively to place marks on a cake that divide it into equal or approximately equal halves, the...
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