Anticommunism in popular culture: the evolution and contestation of “anticommunist films” in South Korea

enemy” in the minds of South Korean conservatives who returned to power in 2008 rather than a real general in the 1950s. This film differs from post-1990 war films by clearly establishing the fact that the Korean War was an invasion of the South by the North, not unlike Cold War anticommunist films, but is more anti-North Korean than anticommunist by presuming that the “enemy” is the Supreme Leader, and not the party, that embodies communist ideology. Anti-North Koreanism, which began to appear in the late 1960s, came to pervade all of popular culture after it no longer had any targets with the fall of real socialism, criticizing the altered form of socialism in North Korea which differed from socialist countries of the past. This film, based on the true story of young students risking their lives on the battlefield for a young and still yet powerless nation, is no different than an epic poem dedicated to the 71 students who gave up their lives for the birth of the nation. The scenes of student soldiers resolutely writing a pledge in their blood and their mothers calmly sending them off to battle overlaps with propaganda war films in the last days of the Japanese empire (Lee, Hana 2013). Despite the government being merely two years old, the students are fully determined to save the “nation” from communism, and these images overlap with those of wartime right wing organizations’ fanatic sweep of leftwingers and the baptism of far-right youths in anticommunist education post-1970s. The film clearly presumes the “Republic of Korea” as a counterpart to North Korea and features the same sentimental context and emphasis on patriotism and the legitimacy of the “Republic of Korea” advocated by right-wing scholars in the left-right wing debates over contemporary Korean history and textbooks in late 2010. Moreover, South Korean conservatives perceived the 2002 Korean maritime border incidents, 2008 Kŭmgang Mountain tourist shooting, 2010 ROKS Chŏnan sinking, and the third North Korean test trial of nuclear missiles as a sequence of events wherein North Korea threatened the existing peace in East Asia, and thus emphasized the founding and patriotism for the “Republic of Korea” as a counterpart to the North. This new anti-North Koreanism appears in several forms in popular culture. In late 2011, comprehensive television programming channels broadcast the first airwaves of programming on North Korea in various forms. Channels such as TV Chosun (TV Chosŏn) which allocated much of its news programming on North Korea and the entertainment program Now On My Way to Meet You (Ije mannarŏ kamnida) on Channel A particularly expend their efforts into reproducing variants on anti-North Koreanism in the present day. On the internet, the community board Ilbe, mainly operated by farright netizens, publicly advocates a twisted form of patriotism and anti-North Koreanism. Spy films descending from past anticommunist films are also a form of media which circulate this new variant of anti-North Koreanism. However, it is interesting to note that the spy drama IRIS, a spinoff of Swiri (Shwiri, dir: Kang Che-kyu, 1991) and the South Korean boyNorth Korean girl melodrama The King 2 Hearts (Tŏk’ing t’uhach’ŭ, dir: Yi Che-kyu, 2012) vaguely rather than directly criticized the South and North Korea governments with their narratives of South and North Korea working together against international organizations fomenting war. Rejecting criticism of the North Lee Asian Journal of German and European Studies (2016) 1:9 Page 13 of 21 Korean ruling authorities while portraying extremist radicals as a minority was a way of slightly steering away from anti-North Koreanism. However, recently released spy films actively portray the ruling authorities in North Korea as “behind the scenes villains.” Spies under their command, or agents, are busy eking out a living (The Spy, Kanch’ŏp, dir: U Min-ho, 2012), constantly doubted by their superiors (The Berlin File, Perŭllin, dir: Ryu Sŭng-wan, 2012), or betrayed and discarded in the end (Secretly, Greatly, Ŭnmil hage widae hage, dir: Chang Ch’ul-su, 2013). These ex-spies and spies are not the incarnations of ideologies in the past but merely scapegoats in the internal succession struggles after Kim Jong-il’s death (Alumni, Tongch’angsaeng, dir: Pak Hŭng-su, 2012). After president Bush labelled North Korea as part of the “axis of evil,” images of the country in Hollywood movies included it being the head of a barbaric international terrorist organization, a corrupt hereditary regime, and an immoral government with contempt for its people’s safety. South Korean netizens, who even about 10 years ago would have boycotted Hollywood blockbusters negatively portraying North Korea, no longer show any repulsion towards South Korean films depicting North Korea as “villains.” An even stronger antiNorth Koreanism is reproduced in these films which are more entertaining = popular and more humanist than past “anticommunist” films before them. The Spy is a story of spies who will do anything for their family and money and are regarded as not particularly threatening by the South Korean government. To them, grandiose ideology nor the cause of “unification of the fatherland” is that important; what matters are their livelihoods and the safety of their families. The superior officer who comes down to order an assassination is strongly reminiscent of “coldblooded and heartless” killers frequently seen in past anticommunist films, and the person behind the order is of course the supreme authority in North Korea. The immorality and greed of the top North Korean authority behind the scenes also pressures the protagonist in The Berlin File. Here North Korea does not embody communism but only acts on its immoral authority to exploit the people to fill its own belly. In Secretly, Greatly, spies who have assimilated into a South Korean shantytown resist sudden orders from the party to commit suicide, and the authority behind the order seeks to assassinate them in preparation for their resistance. In Alumni, the ruling authorities in North Korea are not unified, and their power struggles are repeated between the spies in South Korea. The North Korean ruling authorities aiming the dagger of betrayal at their people and their internal feuds, spies who assimilated into capitalist society and became accustomed to the people there, spies used and discarded because of both family and love, spies sacrificed in the power struggles over the hereditary regime, and South Korean agents viewing this all with pity are all frameworks frequently seen in 1970s anticommunist films and Special Investigations Bureau. This is none other than the viewpoint of South Korea as the victor, with a regime superior to the North’s and the game having already ended with their victory. As shown in the box office numbers of over 7 million viewers of The Berlin File and Secretly, Greatly and over 1 million viewers of Alumni, the gaze of the victor is now ubiquitous among the South Korean populace. This gaze is problematic in that it makes young viewers naturally assent to anti-North Koreanism while consuming this genre of film and allows for regulating their political tendencies and perspectives on the issue of South and North Korea. Lee Asian Journal of German and European Studies (2016) 1:9 Page 14 of 21 Results and discussion Viewing the changes in anticommunist films over the decades shows how anticommunism and popular culture ran in parallel or contradicted one another. The following results in this study can be summarized thus: 1. Anticommunist films were not clearly defined since their inception, and this was also true of anticommunism. 2. The many controversies over the coexistence of anticommunism and humanism in 1950–60s anticommunist films brought the ruling class to tolerate the combination of the two in the end. The combination of anticommunism’s ambiguities with humanism on the contrary instilled awareness of North Korea as still part of the same people and nation. 3. With the wholesale decline of the film industry, 1970–80s anticommunist films did not do well without a heavy dose of entertainment, and as a result, their ideology suffered for it. This was one sign that anticommunism as a whole was gradually growing further apart from the sensitivities of the populace. 4. The end of the Cold War worldwide and the democratization of South Korean society during the 1990-2000s brought new challenges to anticommunist films. War films, one of the two pillars of the genre, changed to having a self-examining perspective of the nation rather than focusing on anticommunism. 5. With the rise of conservative administrations again since 2008 and North Korea’s nuclear tests and the third generation of the Kim dynasty, spy films, the other pillar of the genre, as well as war films, again showed a clear resurgence in anticommunist tendencies. 6. These variations over the decades in anticommunist films which portray the South-North conflict are in fact proxies for the South-South ideological conflicts. In this way, “anticommunist films” do not necessarily spread anticommunism as claimed in the literature up till now. Although the films portray a South-North conflict, they in fact represent the South-South ideological conflicts in many instances. This can be seen in their function of seeking to unify the South Korean populace and politics and cutting off criticism of its institutions at the root rather than anticommunism having the goal of opposing North Korea or communism. Thus, “anticommunist films” that underwent changes and variants since democratization also at times had conflicting positions: supporting progressive politics by introspectively viewing the Cold War South Korean state itself, or supporting anti-North Koreanism and patriotism by criticizing South Korean administrations friendly to North Korea and progressives. The conservative regression under the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations of so-called “’87 institutions” won as a result of the June 1987 struggle has seen the production of many war films and spy films with antiNorth Korean characteristics. As seen above, Cold War “anticommunist films” carried tendencies that were not necessarily anticommunist in the process of acquiring mass popularity. Considering that they flaunted them openly after democratization, the prominence of South-South ideological conflicts in current politics as seen through war and spy films is due to the dualities and ambiguities existing in ‘anticommunism.’ Lee Asian Journal of German and European Studies (2016) 1:9 Page 15 of 21 Conclusion: South-South ideological conflicts through proxy wars in popular culture In July 2015, Northern Limit Line (Yŏnpyŏng haejŏn, dir: Kim Hak-sun, 2015) was narrowly released with help from the government after over 7 years of halting development. Despite the lack of interest in film circles and critically harsh reviews, the film drew over 6 million viewers, making it a commercial success. The film, which dealt with a battle with North Korean forces on the Yellow Sea in June 2002 at the height of the World Cup fervor, could have been called a ‘Veterans Safeguarding the Nation film’ for glorifying the heroic sacrifice of the South Korean navy men. Despite merely emphasizing their individual sacrifices, its outspoken criticism of Kim Dae-jung’s North Korea policy at the time shows that it had no interest in overcoming the anticommunism that Korean War films in the 2000s targeted. Moreover, analyses from each of the ruling and opposition party representatives that saw the film in light of the past administration’s North Korea national security policies clearly exposed how anticommunism was a basis of right-wing claims in the South-South ideological conflict (i.e. left-right wing conflict in South Korea). The fact that the film’s extreme right wing concept was the main culprit behind its cold reception in film circles and the causes of its production crises clearly illustrates this situation. As shown in the film, anti-North Koreanism in ‘anticommunist films’ was not expressed as opposing North Korea, but intensifying criticism of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine policy which embraced North Korea, and its continuation by the Noh Mu-hyŏn administration and the consciousness of its supporters, as seditious and dangerous. Although the world has now long left the Cold War period behind, the Cold War situation of tension in the Korean peninsula continues and anticommunism still wields a strong influence. Despite the meaninglessness of regime competition in the past, the fact that the National Security Act symbolizing anticommunism could not be abolished again reminds us that anticommunism was one of the supporting pillars of South Korea. While at a glance it seems that the red complex of the past has been overcome, anticommunism meanwhile is reproduced in the name of peace, security, and human rights, and continues to arouse anti-North Korean sentiment over the veneer of popular culture. “Anticommunist films” promoted as part of the nation’s enlightenment in the Cold War period could not help but be fragmented in clashing with the popularity of genre films. The anticommunist sentiment that sought to exclude North Korea from the nation in past anticommunist films had difficulty in overcoming the combination of nationalist sentiment that induced both emotion and tears. It could be said post-1990 war films were fated to become commercial films filled with mostly nationalist sentiment that aimed for popular themes of humanism through a critical viewpoint of the South Korean government. In addition, the more South Korea feels superior and confident to North Korea, the more spy films become more polished and vary into a form of “anti-North Korean film.” Korean films which did not criticize the North Korean elite, acting as extensions of the people’s government and participatory government’s Sunshine Policy, regressed to the lineage of past traditional “anticommunist films,” criticizing the North Korean elite and viewing the North Korean people used as their pawns with pity after the incoming of conservatives into power and the third generation of North Korean succession. On the contrary, if past “anticommunist films” treated the North Korean people Lee Asian Journal of German and European Studies (2016) 1:9 Page 16 of 21 as part of the same nation on the basis of homogeneity, the new “anticommunist films” today pity and tolerate them from the gaze of a victor from a fundamentally different existence. With the number of people who remember what it was like before division and those carrying the pain of separated families decreasing, the awareness of unification by the younger generation who enjoyed accelerated economic wealth after division weakening, and the decline of nationalism as an ideology and the poverty of logic behind unification in this age, the viewpoint of North Korea in popular culture is playing a role in strengthening the 38 parallel in our minds. However, anticommunism cannot but maintain an unstable existence in popular culture as the “nation” still resonates more strongly than “anticommunism” with the populace and reflection and criticism of the South Korea are in and of themselves the clearest criticisms of anticommunism. Anticommunism wearing the trappings of “anticommunist film” has lived with and evolved with popular culture but has also come into conflict with and created discord with it. As film is based on the sympathy of the populace, the popular circulation and consumption of anticommunist sentiment is not the same as that of the past. The left-right conflict in today’s politics is embodied in anticommunist films versus non-(or anti-)anticommunist films, and thus while war and spy films on the surface deal with the North-south conflict, internally they are proxies of South-South ideological conflicts. Anticommunism is used to deflect blame for internal conflicts in South Korean society towards the other and as a suppression mechanism towards opponents and will continue to survive so long as the South-North conflict continues and South Korean society does not completely democratize. However, popular culture based on the affects of the populace will not allow anticommunism to continue in the same form of the past. This is why anticommunism and popular culture are fundamentally at odds with one another. Endnotes For recent studies on anticommunism, see: Kim Chŏng-hun, Cho Hŭi-yŏn, Chibae tamnon ŭrosŏ ŭi pan’gongjuŭi wa kŭ pyŏnhwa ‘Pan’gong kyuyul sahoe’ ŭi pyŏnhwarŭl chungshim ŭro [Anticommunism as a Dominant Discourse and its Changes – Focusing on an ‘Anticommunist Regulated Society’], Cho Hŭi-yŏn ed., Han’gug ŭi chŏngch’i sahoejŏk chibae tamnon kwa minjujuŭi tonghak [Dominant Sociopolitical Discourses in South Korea and Dynamics of Democracy] (Seoul: Hamkke Ingnŭn Ch’aek, 2003); Fuji Takeshi, Che 1konghwaguk ŭi chibae ideollogi wa kŭ pyŏnyongdŭl [The Ruling Ideologies of the First Republic: Anti-Communism and its Variants], Yoksa Pip’yŏng 83 (The Institute of Korean Historical Studies, Summer 2008); Fuji Takeshi, 4-19/5-16 Shigi ŭi pan’gong ch’eje chaep’yŏn kwa kŭ nolli [The Reformation and Logic of the Anticommunist System of the April 19 and May 16 Period], Critical Studies in Modern Korean History 25 (The Institute of Korean Historical Studies, 2011); Fuji Takeshi, 1950-yŏndae pan’gong kyojae ŭi chŏngch’ihak [The Politics of 1950s Anticommunist Education Materials], Critical Studies in Modern Korean History 30, (The Institute of Korean Historical Studies, 2011); Lee Hana, 1950-60-yŏndae pan’gongjuŭi tamnon kwa kamsŏng chŏngch’i [1950-60s Anticommunist Discourse and Politics of Affect], Sociohistory 95 (Korean Social History Association, 2012), etc. There is abundant comparative research on anticommunism’s influence on literature: Sanghur Society, Pan’gongjuŭi wa han’guk munhak [Anticommunism and Korean Literature], (Kip’ŭn Saem, 2005), Kim Jin Gi, Lee Asian Journal of German and European Studies (2016) 1:9 Page 17 of 21 et al., Pan’gongjuŭi wa Han’gung munhak ŭi kŭndaejŏk tonghak 1,2 [Anticommunism and the Modern Dynamics of Korean Literature Volumes 1 & 2] (Seoul: Hanul, 2008, 2009), Kim Chun-hyŏn, Pan’gongjuŭi ŭi naemyŏnhwa wa 1960 -yŏndae p’ungja sosŏr ŭi han kyŏnghyang – I Ho-ch’ŏl Sŏ Ki-wŏn ŭi tanp’yŏn ŭl chungshim ŭro [The Internalization of Anticommunism and Trends in 1960s Satirical Novels – Focusing on the Short Stories of Yi Ho-ch’ŏl and Sŏ Ki-wŏn], Sanghur Hakbo 21 (Seoul: Sanghur Society, 2007), Kim Jin Gi, Pan’gongŭi naemyŏnhwa wa chŏngch’esŏng ŭi kuch’uk : Son Ch’angsŏp sosŏrŭl chungshim ŭro [Internalization of Anticommunism and Construction of Identity – Focusing on the Novels of Son Ch’ang-sŏp], ibid. However, research focusing on the relationship between anticommunism and anticommunist films but not anticommunism itself is rather rare. Lee Hana, Kamsŏng kwa konggongsŏng: kamsŏng ŭi yŏksarŭl mutta; pan’gongjuŭi kamsŏng kihoek, “pan’gong yŏnghwa” ŭi tillema -1950 ~ 60 -yŏndae “pan’gong yŏnghwa” nonjaeng ŭl chungshim ŭro [Affect and Publicness; Questioning the Historicity of Affect: The dilemma of “anticommunist films” as a project of affect; With a focus on the “anticommunist film” arguments in the 1950′s ~ 1960′s], The Journal of Korean Studies 159 (Seoul: Yonsei Institute of Korean Studies, 2012). Ibid., pg. 204–205. In the above writing, the author understands anticommunism as an emotional complex combining diverse and contradictory logics and sentiments, classifying 1950s–60s anticommunism into ten general categories. Kim Dŭk-chung, Ppalgaengi ŭi t’ansaeng – Yŏsun sagŏn kwa pan’gong kukka ŭi hyŏngsŏng [The Birth of the ‘Reds’ – The Yŏsun Incident and Formation of the Anticommunist State] (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2009). Pak Se-hwa, Pan’gong t’aese kanghwarŭl wihan sogo [A Brief Study on Strengthening Anticommunist Readiness], Kyŏngch’al 2–4, 1963, pgs. 126–132. Although anticommunist films also existed in Hollywood, they cannot be seen as an independent genre developing over the course of decades. On 1920–30s Hollywood anticommunist films, see John J. Gladchuk, Hollywood and Anticommunism: HUAC and the Evolution of the Red Menace, 1935–1950, Routledge, 2013, pgs.115–130. There are possible differences of opinion over whether these can still be called “anticommunist films.” Therefore, they are also labelled as “division films” rather than “anticommunist films.” In order to explicate on “anticommunist films” here, we use the term “anticommunist film.” On the definition of “division films,” see Byun Jai-Ran, Namhan yŏnghwa e nat’anan Pukhan e taehan ihae [Understanding of North Korea appearing in South Korean Films -focusing on Swiri, Spy Lee Chul-Jin and Joint Security Area. JSA], Yŏnghwa yŏngu 16 (Han’guk Yŏnghwa Hakhoe, 2001). Chung Young Kwon, Han’guk pan’gong yŏnghwa tamnon ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa chŏnjaeng yŏnghwa changnŭ ŭi kiwŏn 1949 ~ 1956 [A Study of the Formation of Discourse on Anti-communist Films and the Origin of War Film in South Korea between 1949 and 1956], Contemporary Film Research 10 (Hanyang University Contemporary Film Research Institute, 2010), pgs. 385–391. Although there are lowbrow genres of anticommunist films on the tragedy of national division such as social dramas, melodramas, and action dramas, these stories mostly take place during or after the war. The former usually are of films on the war and the latter with films on spies. Here war films refer to not only “combat films” which mostly have combat scenes, but a broader definition of films where war directly influences the narrative. In addition, although there are war spy films dealing with the Lee Asian Journal of German and European Studies (2016) 1:9 Page 18 of 21 activities of wartime spies, they are classified as war films or spy films depending on which aspect they emphasize. As most war spy films emphasized espionage activities rather than combat scenes, there are more cases of the latter. For anticommunist education as emotional education, see Lee Hana, ibid., pgs. 224–230. The cultural film Let’s Not Deceive Again (Tashinŭn sokchi malja, dir: Pak Yŏng-il, 1964) is an animated film produced directly by the government where South Korean civilians are portrayed as rabbits and the North Korean people are depicted as wolf spies wearing rabbit masks. Lee Hana, ibid., pgs. 75–77. For debates on 1950–60s anticommunist films, see Kim So-yŏn, Chŏnhu Han’guk ŭi yŏnghwa tamnon esŏ ‘riŏllijŭm’ ŭi ŭimi e kwan hayŏ: P’iagor ŭi met’a bip’yŏng ŭl t’onghan chŏpkŭn [On ‘Realism’ in Postwar Korean Film Discourse: A Metacritical Approach to Piagol], Kim So-yŏn, et al., Maehok kwa hondon ŭi shidae: 50 -yŏndae Han’guk yŏnghwa [The Age of Fascination and Chaos: Fifty Years of Korean Film] (Seoul: Sodo, 2003); Chung Young Kwon, Han’guk pan’gong yŏnghwa tamnon ŭi hyŏngsŏnggwa chŏnjaeng yŏnghwa changnŭ ŭi kiwŏn 1949 ~ 1956 [A Study of the Formation of Discourse on Anti-communist Films and the Origin of War Film in South Korea between 1949 and 1956], Contemporary Film Research 10 (Hanyang University Contemporary Film Research Institute, 2010); Kim Han Sang, Naengjŏn ch’eje wa naesyŏnŏl shinema ŭi honjongjŏk wŏnch’ŏn : Chugŏm ŭi sangja tŭng Kim Kiyŏng ŭi Migongpowŏn (USIS) munhwa yŏnghwarŭl chungshim ŭro [Cold War and the Hybrid Upspring of South Korean National Cinema -On Boxes of Death and Kim Ki-Young’s USIS Public Information Films], Yŏnghwayŏngu 47 (Han’guk Yŏnghwa Hakhoe, 2011); Lee Hana, ibid. In 1955, the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Public Information, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Home Affairs oversaw tasks regarding film before it became the Ministry of Education became the office of primary concern for films. Im Kŭng-chae, Sŏnjŏn kach’i wa yŏnghwa yesulsŏng pan’gong yŏnghwa pip’an ŭi shibi t’ŭk’i P’iagorŭl chungshim hayŏ [Propaganda Value and Cinematic Aesthetics – Anticommunist Film Criticism and Debates, Focusing on Piagol], Tonga Ilbo, 1955.8.12; Im Chŏng-sŏn, Han’guk yŏnghwa ŭi saeroun sŭt’ail P’iagol ŭi sogam [The New Style of Korean Film – Thoughts on Piagol], Kyŏnghyang Sinmun, 1955.9.30. Lee Hana, ibid., pgs. 211–212. I Man-hŭi kamdog e kwandaehan ch’ŏbun ŭl [The Generous Treatment of Director Lee Man-hŭi], Tonga Ilbo, 1965.2.9; Yi Yŏng-il, 1965-yŏn naeoe yŏnghwa kyŏlsan Han’guk yŏnghwa ch’ongp’yŏng [An Evaluation of 1965 Domestic and Foreign Films – A General Review of Korean Films], Yŏnghwa Yesul 1, 1996. For the refinement of anticommunism into anti-North Koreanism, see Lee Hana, ibid., pgs. 222–223. After the April 19 Revolution, fervor for unification grew stronger throughout society and the historical experience of various unification theories being proposed can be seen as a cause of the Park regime focusing on suppressing other unification theories. Yun Chong-hyŏn, Kongsanjuŭi wa shin minjokchuŭinŭn ŏttŏn kwan’gye in’ga [How Are Communism and New Nationalism Related?], Sedae 13, 143, 1976, pgs. 150–157. Lee Asian Journal of German and European Studies (2016) 1:9 Page 19 of 21 Kim Ch’ang-sun, Kongsanjuŭi wa minjokchuŭinŭn hapchaki kanŭng han’ga [Is Collaboration Between Communism and Nationalism Possible], Kukje Munje 66, 1976, pgs. 54–60. Oh Che-do, Nambuk taehwa wa p’yŏnghwa t’ongil [South-North Dialogue and Peaceful Unification], Byŏnhosa 5, 1974, pgs. 203–218. The Institute of Counterespionage ed., Chigong kyoyuk tokpon [Knowing Communism Education Reader] (Seoul: Hŭkbaek Munhwasa, 1972), pgs. 824–838. Lee Hana, ibid., pgs. 69–72. Kim T’ae-su, Kungmin ch’onghwarŭl wihan yŏnghwa yesul: Anbo yŏnghwa ŭi chejak panghyang kwa taejungsŏng [Cinematic Art for National Unification: The Popularity and Directions for Security Film Production], Korea Cinema May, 1972; Cho Yŏnhyŏn, Kungmin ch’onghwarŭl wihan yŏnghwa yesul: Anboyŏnghwa ŭi sojae wa kŭ kusŏng [Cinematic Art for National Unification: Topics and Composition of Security Films], Korea Cinema May, 1972. Kim So-tong, Pan’gong yŏnghwa ŭi sojae, p’yohyŏn, kŭrigo taejungsŏng [Topics, Expression, and Popularity of Security Films], Yŏnghwa 4–6 (Seoul: Yŏnghwa Chinhŭng Kongsa, 1976), pgs. 21–25. Although TV aired many dramas on war which were not popular as films, the most representative was the drama Comrades (Chŏnu) which aired from 1975–78 to 1983– 84. This was made as a special feature on the 25 anniversary of the Korean War by KBS and remade in 2010 by KBS on the 60 anniversary of the Korean War. So Rae-sŏp, Puronhan Kyŏngsŏng ŭn myŏngnang hara: shingminji Chosŏn ŭl p’agodŭn kŭndaejŏk kamjŏng ŭi t’ansaeng [Make Rebellious Kyongsong Merry: The Birth of Modern Affect in Colonial Korea] (Seoul: Ungjin Chisik Hausu, 2011); Kim Chungkang, Hyŏndae Han’guk ŭi yŏnghwa chaegŏn nolli wa k’omidi yŏnghwa ŭi chŏngch’ijŏk hamŭi (1945–60) Myŏngnang hago yuk’wae han’palchŏn Taehanmin’guk’ mandŭlgi [Making a Bright, Healthy Nation: Cinema Reconstruction Movement and the Politics of Comedy Film Production in the late 1950s’ South Korea], Chin-Tan hakbo 112 (Chin-Tan Society, 2011). It is difficult to presume the exact number of “anticommunist films” as it can differ according to the definition of the category. According to statistics by a mid-1970s critic, there were a total of 242 films from 1946 to 1975, 8.99 % of 2,736 theatrical features. The much lower number of theatrical features in the 1970s to 80s saw a similar proportion of anticommunist films. KIU, Sŏnggyŏk pŏl ro pon pan’gong yŏnghwa 30 -yŏn [Thirty Years of Anticommunist Films by Category], Yŏnghwa 4–6 (Seoul: Yŏnghwa Chinhŭng Kongsa, 1976), pg. 34. Yi T’ae, Nambugun [A North Korean Partisan in South Korea], (Seoul: Ture, 1988). “Excellent Films” were popular films selected by the government for coinciding with their aims of reconstructing the nation. See Lee Hana, 1950 -yŏndae minjok munhwa tamnon kwa ‘usu yŏnghwa’ [1950s National Cultural Discourses and “Excellent Films”], Yŏksa Pip’yŏng 92 (The Institute for Korean Historical Studies, 2011). Ministry of National Defense, Order 89. Kunsa kwan’gye yŏnghwa chejak chiwŏn kyujŏng [Regulations on Support for the Production of Military-Related Films], 1965.11.3. 1999′s Swiri (Shwiri, dir: Kang Che-kyu, 1999) mobilized over six million viewers, beating the 1998 release of the Hollywood blockbuster Titanic’s (dir: James Lee Asian Journal of German and European Studies (2016) 1:9 Page 20 of 21 Cameron, 1997) record of 5.2 million viewers. A Korean film defeating an American film at the box office was also a nationalist aspiration here. Korean films, which were less than 30 % of box office sales, continued to grow to 60 % in 2006, dropping in 2007 and then recovering in 2009. As of August 2013 they make up 89 % of box office sales. Lee Hana, Taehan min’guk, chaekŏn ŭi sidae (1948–1968) [The Republic of Korea: The Age of Reconstruction (1948–1968)] (Seoul: Purun Yuksa, 2013). Chong U-kon, Pukhan suryŏngje chŏngch’i ch’eje ŭi chedohwa wa t’ŭksŏng [The Systemization of North Korea’s “Supreme Leader” Political Institution and its Characteristics],The Korean Journal of Unification Affairs 9-1 (The Institute for Peace Affairs, 1997). Lee Hana, The Unending War: Continuity and Rupture in Korean War films in Post-Cold War Era, SOAS Conference 2013, London University, 2013.5.31 This refers to the release of 007: Die Another Day (dir: Lee Tamahori) in 2002. The actor Ch’a In-p’yo refused to be cast in the film since the film belittled North Korea. However, these films cannot be said to be deliberately inspiring anti-North Koreanism. While preparing to star in The Berlin File, the director Ryu Sŭng-wan also appeared in an interesting TV documentary called Time (T’aim Ryu Sŭngwan kamdok ŭi kanch’ŏp, MBC, 2011). The director and a journalist try to find the spy but fail in the end, and the film harshly satirizes South Korean’s society’s discourse on espionage. The film is sometimes more effective than the director and producer had intended. Acknowledgement The first draft of this paper was written for a project comparing anticommunism in Germany and South Korea. I am grateful to the supervisors of this project, namely Christoph Pohlman, the head of Seoul branch of the Evert Foundation in Germany and Professor Dongchun Kim of Sungkonghoe University in South Korea. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Andrew David Jackson, Associate Professor of the University of Copenhagen in Denmark, who offered me two opportunities to present my papers in Europe. Competing interests The author declares that she has no competing interests. Received: 29 March 2016 Accepted: 2 August 2016 ReferencesByun, Jai-Ran. 2001. Namhan yŏnghwa e nat’anan Puk’han taehan ihae [Understanding on North Korea appearing inSouth Korean Films -focusing on Swiri, Spy Lee Chul-Jin and Joint Security Area. JSA], Yŏnghwayŏngu 16. Han’gukYŏnghwa Hakhoe.Chin-ki, Kim, et al. 2008, 2009. Pan’gongjuŭi wa Han’guk munhak ŭi kŭndaejŏk tonghak 1,2 [Anticommunism and theModern Dynamics of Korean Literature Volumes 1 & 2]. Seoul: Hanul.Chong U-kon. 1997. Puk’an suryŏngje chŏngch’i ch’ejeŭi chedohwa wa t’ŭksŏng [The Systemization of North Korea’s“Supreme Leader” Political Institution and its Characteristics], The Korean Journal of Unification Affairs 9-1. The Institutefor Peace Affairs.Chŏng-hun, Kim, and Cho Hŭi-yŏn. 2003. Chibae tamnon ŭrosŏ ŭi pan’gongjuŭi wa kŭ pyŏnhwa ‘Pan’gongkyuyulsahoe’ ŭi pyŏnhwarŭl chungshim ŭro [Anticommunism as a Dominant Discourse and its Changes –Focusing on an ‘Anticommunist Regulated Society’]. In Han’guk ŭi chŏngch’I sahoejŏk chibae tamnon kwa minjujuŭitonghak [Dominant Sociopolitical Discourses in South Korea and Dynamics of Democracy], ed. Cho Hŭi-yŏn. Seoul:Hamkkeingnŭnch’aek.Chung, Young Kwon. 2010. Han’guk pan’gong yŏnghwa tamnon ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa chŏnjaeng yŏnghwa changnŭ ŭikiwŏn 1949~1956 [A Study of the Formation of Discourse on Anti-communist Films and the Origin of War Film inSouth Korea between 1949 and 1956], Contemporary Film Research 10. Hanyang University Contemporary FilmResearch Institute.Chung-Kang, Kim. 2011. Hyŏndae Han’gugŭi Yŏnghwa Chaegŏnnolliwa K’omidi Yŏnghwaŭi Chŏngch’ijŏk Hamŭi (1945-60)Myŏngnanghago Yuk’waehan ‘Palchŏn Taehanmin’guk’ Mandŭlgi [Making a Bright, Healthy Nation: CinemaReconstruction Movement and the Politics of Comedy Film Production in the late 1950s’ South Korea], Chin-Tan Hakbo112. Chin-Tan Society.Chun-hyŏn, Kim. 2007.Pan’gongjuŭi ŭi naemyŏnhwa wa 1960-yŏndae p’ungja sosŏr ŭi han kyŏnghyang – I Ho-ch’ŏl SŏKiwŏn ŭi tanp’yŏn ŭl chungshim ŭro [The Internalization of Anticommunism and Trends in 1960s Satirical Novels –Focusing on the Short Stories of Yi Ho-ch’ŏl and Sŏ Ki-wŏn], Sanghur Hakbo 21. Seoul: Sanghur Society. Lee Asian Journal of German and European Studies (2016) 1:9Page 21 of 21 Dŭk-chung, Kim. 2009. Ppalgaengi ŭi t’ansaeng – Yŏsun sagŏn kwa pan’gong kukka ŭi hyŏngsŏng [The Birth of the ‘Reds’– The Yŏsun Incident and Formation of the Anticommunist State]. Seoul: Sŏnin.Fuji Takeshi. 2011. 4-19/5-16 shigi ŭi pan’gong ch’eje chaep’yŏn kwa kŭ nolli [The Reformation and Logic of theAnticommunist System of the April 19 and May 16 Period], Critical Studies in Modern Korean History 25. TheInstitute of Korean Historical Studies.Fuji, Takeshi. 2011. 1950-yŏndae pan’gong kyojae ŭi chŏngch’ihak [The Politics of 1950s Anticommunist EducationMaterials], Critical Studies in Modern Korean History 30. The Institute of Korean Historical Studies.Han-Sang, Kim. 2011. Naengjŏn ch'eje wa naesyŏnŏl shinema ŭi honjongjŏk wŏnch'ŏn: Chugŏm ŭi sangja tŭng Kim Ki-yŏng ŭi Migongbowŏn (USIS) Munhwa yŏnghwarŭl chungshim ŭro [Cold War and the Hybrid Upspring of SouthKorean National Cinema -On Boxes of Death and Kim Ki-Young's USIS Public Information Films], Yŏnghwa Yŏngu 47.Han'guk Yŏnghwa Hakhoe.Hŭi-yŏn, Cho (ed.). 2003. Han’guk ŭi chŏngch’I sahoejŏk chibae tamnon kwa minjujuŭi tonghak [Dominant SociopoliticalDiscourses in South Korea and Dynamics of Democracy]. Seoul: Hamkkeingnŭnch’aek.Kyŏngch’al; Kukje Munje; Byŏnhosa; Sedae; Yŏnghwa; Yŏnghwa Yesul; Korea Cinema; Tonga Ilbo; Kyŏnghyang Sinmun.Lee, Hana. 2013a. Kukga wa Yŏnghwa [The Nation andCinema]. Seoul: Hyean.Lee, Hana. 2013b. Taehan min’guk, chaekŏn ŭi sidae (1948-1968) [The Republic of Korea: The Age of Reconstruction (1948–1968)]. Seoul: Purun Yuksa.Lee Hana. 2012. 1950-60-yŏndae Pan’gongjuŭi tamnon kwa kamsŏng chŏngch’i [1950-60s Anticommunist Discourse andPolitics of Affect], Sociohistory 95. Korean Social History Association.Lee Hana. 2013. The Unending War: Continuity and Rupture in Korean War films in Post-Cold War Era, SOAS Conference2013. London University. 5.31.Lee, Hana. 2011. 1950-yŏndae minjok munhwa tamnon kwa ‘usu yŏnghwa’ [1950s National Cultural Discourses and“Excellent Films”], Yŏksa Pip’yŏng 92. The Institute for Korean Historical Studies.Lee, Hana. 2012. Kamsŏnggwa konggongsŏng: Kamsŏng ŭi yŏksarŭl mutta; Pan’gongjuŭi kamsŏng kihoek, “pan’gongyŏnghwa” ŭi tillema -1950 ~ 60-yŏndae “pan’gong yŏnghwa” nonjaengŭl chungshim ŭro [Affect and Publicness;Questioning over the Historicity of Affect : The dilemma of “anticommunist films” as a project of affect; With a focus onthe “anticommunist film” arguments in the 1950′s ~ 1960′s], The Journal of Korean Studies 159. Seoul: Yonsei Instituteof Korean Studies.Rae-sŏp, So. 2011. Puronhan Kyŏngsŏngŭn myŏngnang hara: shingminji Chosŏnŭl p’agodŭn kŭndaejŏk kamjŏng ŭit’ansaeng [Make Rebellious Kyongsong Merry: The Birth of Modern Affect Borrowed in Colonial Korea]. Seoul: UngjinChisik Hausu.Sanghur Society. 2005. Pan’gongjuŭi wa Han’guk munhak [Anticommunism and Korean Literature]. Kip’ŭn Saem.So-yŏn, Kim. 2003. Chŏnhu Han’guk ŭi yŏnghwa tamnon esŏ ‘riŏllijŭm’ ŭi ŭimie kwan hayŏ: P’iagor ŭi met’a pip’yŏng ŭlt’onghan chŏpkŭn [On ‘Realism’ in Postwar Korean Film Discourse: A Metacritical Approach to Piagol]. In Maehokkwa hondonŭi shidae: 50 -yŏndae Han’guk yŏnghwa [The Age of Fascination and Chaos: Fifty Years of Korean Film],ed. Kim So-yŏn et al. Seoul: Sodo.So-yŏn, Kim, et al. 2003. Maehok kwa hondonŭi shidae: 50-yŏndae Han’guk yŏnghwa [The Age of Fascination and Chaos:Fifty Years of Korean Film]. Seoul: Sodo.Tae, Yi. 1988. Nambugun [A North Korean Partisan in South Korea]. Seoul: Ture.Takeshi, Fuji. 2008. Che 1konghwaguk ŭi chibae ideollogi [The Ruling Ideologies of the First Republic: Anti-Communism andits Variants], Yoksa Pip’yŏng 83. Summer: The Institute of Korean Historical Studies.The Institute of Counterespionage (ed.). 1972. Chigong kyoyuk tokpon [Knowing Communism Education Reader]. Seoul:Hŭkbaek munhwasa. Submit your manuscript to ajournal and benefi t from: 7 Convenient online submission7 Rigorous peer review7 Immediate publication on acceptance7 Open access: articles freely available online7 High visibility within the field7 Retaining the copyright to your article Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com