Image-based de re thought

In this paper I argue that in addition to the three generally recognized kinds of de re thought, i.e., perception-based, memory-based and communication-based thought, there is a kind of de re thought, which is based on image and cannot be assimilated to any of these recognized kinds of de re thought. I call it simply image-based de re thought. Although image-based thought shares some similarities with the other kinds of de re thought, it should and can be distinguished from each of them. The focus of this paper is on the distinction between image-based thought and perception-based thought, as it is this distinction that is either overlooked or denied by philosophers who have no difficulty seeing the distinct role of images in our thinking about things in the world. It has been generally accepted as useful by philosophers that our thoughts about things be roughly divided into two kinds, de re and de dicto. According to one account of the distinction, to think of something in a de re way is to think of it directly, that is, as unmediated by some concept expressed by ‘the F’, whereas to think of something de dicto is to think of whatever fits a certain description. A paradigm case of de re thought is when we are perceiving the thing that we are thinking about. In addition, de re thought can also be thought about things that we have previously perceived and presently remember, and thought about things that we are informed of by others who previously perceived (or in some cases are presently perceiving) them. These are the three types of de re thought which are sometimes called (1) perception-based thought, (2) memory-based thought, and 1 Discussions on the de re /de dicto distinction in recent history are believed to have started with Quine’s ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, followed by a flurry of publications on the subject. 2 While I am aware of the wide disparity in the literature as to what counts as a de re thought or a de dicto one, my discussion is based on Kent Bach’s account in Thought and Reference (1987: 11-45), which I have found most persuasive.