On the role of zealotry in the voter model
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the voter model with a finite density of zealots—voters that never change opinion. For equal numbers of zealots of each species, the distribution of magnetization (opinions) is Gaussian in the mean-field limit, as well as in one and two dimensions, with a width that is proportional to 1/ √ Z, where Z is the number of zealots, independent of the total number of voters. Thus just a few zealots can prevent consensus or even the formation of a robust majority.
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