Part Ii: Mind

In the next three chapters I apply the general conclusions of the previous Part to the problem of brains and minds; i.e. the relationship between individual psychology and the neurologi-cal mechanisms that underly it. I concentrate in particular on intentionality; i.e. the way in which our thoughts can be about the outside world, and how this enables us to interact with that world in meaningful ways. In chapter 4 I start by looking at some recent developments in the way we do neuroscience, and how this is reflected in how we try to build artificial intelligences. And in chapters 5 and 6 I apply these empirical results to some of the key issues in the philosophy of mind, including behaviourism, representationalism, mental cau-sation, externalism, and the nature of content. This may seem to be putting the empirical, a posteriori, cart before the philosophical, a priori, horse; but my aim is to loosen the grip of some assumptions that are responsible for needless philosophical problems, and so seeing how thinking things work in the flesh seems a good place to start.