Key Replacement Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme
نویسندگان
چکیده
Yap, Heng and Goi propose an efficient certificateless signature scheme based on the intractability of the computational DiffieHellman problem, and prove that the scheme is secure in the random oracle model. This paper shows that their certificateless signature scheme is vulnerable to key replacement attacks, where an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can forge valid signatures on any messages for that signer without knowing the signer’s private key.
منابع مشابه
An efficient certificateless signcryption scheme in the standard model
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) is a useful method in order to solve the problems of traditional public key infrastructure (i.e., large amount of computation, storage and communication costs for managing certificates) and ID-based public key cryptography (i.e., key escrow problem), simultaneously. A signcryption scheme is an important primitive in cryptographic protocols which ...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
دوره 2006 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006