Random Games and Maximum Likelihood Equilibria
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper considers random games, in which the actual game being played | its player set, the action spaces of the involved players, and their preferences | is determined by a stochastic state of nature. To capture the uncertainty at the planning stage whether or not a certain action choice is feasible, maximum likelihood equilibria are introduced: strategy pro ̄les that lead to equilibrium play with maximum probability. An existence result for maximum likelihood equilibria is given.
منابع مشابه
Maximum likelihood Equilibria in Games with Population Uncertainty
In the games with population uncertainty introduced in this paper, the number and identity of the participating players are determined by chance. Games with population uncertainty are shown to include Poisson games and random-player games. The paper focuses on those strategy pro ̄les that are most likely to yield a Nash equilibrium in the game selected by chance. Existence of maximum likelihood ...
متن کاملOn the Existence of Maximum Likelihood Nash Equilibria
Existence results for maximum likelihood Nash equilibria for random games were given by Borm, Cao and García-Jurado, and by Voorneveld. Here we discuss the relationship of those results with ordinary existence results for Nash equilibria, a traditional subject in game theory.
متن کاملEquilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
In this paper we analyze players’ long-run behavior in evolutionary coordination games with imperfect monitoring in a large population. Players can observe signals corresponding to other players’ unseen actions and use the proposed simple or maximum likelihood estimation algorithm to extract information from the signals. In the simple learning process we find conditions for the risk-dominant an...
متن کاملHow the number of strategies impacts the likelihood of equilibria in random graphical games
This paper studies the likelihood of the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) in random payoff graphical games. Here, players are represented by vertices, they choose a strategy in finite discrete sets of strategies, and the scope of a player’s utility function is only local. In this setting, the probability of existence of a PNE has been deeply studied for various graphical structures wh...
متن کاملAspiration-Based and Reciprocity-Based Rules in Learning Dynamics for Symmetric Normal-Form Games
Psychologically-based rules are important in human behavior and have the potential of explaining equilibrium selection and separatrix crossings to a payoff dominant equilibrium in coordination games. We show how Rule Learning theory can easily accommodate behavioral rules like aspiration-based experimentation and reciprocity-based cooperation, and how to test for the significance of additional ...
متن کامل