Cheap- Talk with Random Stopping
نویسنده
چکیده
CheapTalk with Random Stopping is a Cheap-Talk game in which after each period of communication, with probability 1 >., the talk ends and the players play the original game (i.e, choose actions and receive payoffs). In this paper the relations between Cheap-Talk games and Cheap-Talk with Random Stopping are analyzed. -Institute of Mathematics and Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. This work is part of my PhD Thesis, written under the guidance of Professor Sergiu Hart.
منابع مشابه
Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
We carry out experiments on the Stackelberg game and the second-play Stackelberg game where the leader can revise his decision after the follower has decided. In the second-play Stackelberg game, the leader’s first announcement is cheap talk. The game settings studied include fixed pairs and random matching, and settings where the follower’s information about the leader’s payoffs is complete or...
متن کاملCheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics*
The effect of cheap talk in partnership games on the evolutionary dynamics of homogeneous populations under symmetric and random matching is analyzed. As long as the message set is sufficiently large there exists an Asymptotically Stable Set with payoffs arbitrarily close to the maximal payoff for each player. However this only holds true for each Asymptotically Stable Set if there are no more ...
متن کاملInformation Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk∗
Communication in practice typically occurs through multiple channels, not all of which permit costless misrepresentation of private information. Accordingly, I study a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982), but allow for communication through both cheap talk and messages on a second dimension where misreporting is costly. Using a forward-induction refine...
متن کاملEffects of Cheap Talk on Consumer Willingness-to-Pay for Golden Rice Author:
A large body of literature suggests individuals behave differently when responding to hypothetical valuation questions than when actual payment is required. Such findings have generated a great deal of skepticism over the use of the contingent valuation method and benefit measures derived from it. Recently, a new method, cheap talk, has been proposed to eliminate the potential bias in hypotheti...
متن کاملCoordination and Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Private Information
We consider a Battle of the Sexes game with incomplete information and allow cheap talk regarding players’ private information before the game is played. We prove that the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium has a desirable coordination property. Such coordination can also be obtained as a partially revealing cheap talk equilibrium. These outcomes can also be achieved using ...
متن کامل