Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color∗

Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz’s theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities. When we reflect on the contributions of early modern philosophy to our understanding of the metaphysics of “sensible” or “secondary” qualities such as color, those of Locke and Boyle readily spring to mind, as may those of Descartes, Berkeley, and others.1 But one philosopher we aren’t likely to think of in this connection is Leibniz. Despite all the attention his philosophy has received over the years, little has been written about his views on the nature of color. To make matters worse, what little has been written has not painted him in a particularly flattering light. Margaret Wilson, for instance, has argued that Leibniz does not even have a single consistent way of thinking about sensible qualities (Wilson, 1977). On her reading, his thought exhibits a “pervasive” and “unrationalized” ambivalence toward the nature of such qualities, which manifests itself in a tendency to vacillate uncritically and unselfconsciously between the view that they are reducible to the mechanical qualities of bodies (shapes, motions, etc.), and the incompatible view that they are something like experiences caused in us by such qualities.2 In light of all this, we may well be tempted to conclude that Leibniz gave little thought to the question of the ∗Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 1On Locke’s theory of color, see, among others, Jackson 1929; Curley 1972; Alexander 1976/77; Rickless 1997; Stuart 2003; Jacovides 2007. On Boyle’s, see Curley 1972; Keating 1993; Anstey 2000, Chapter 4. On Descartes’, see Cottingham 1989/90; Nolan Forthcoming. On Berkeley’s, see Wilson 1987; Faaborg 1999; Atherton 2003. The views of Malebranche (Schmaltz, 1995) and Reid (Ganson, 2002; McKitrick, 2002) have also garnered some attention. 2I will follow Leibniz throughout in referring to colors, sounds, odors, flavors, and the like as sensible qualities. In accordance with scholastic tradition, “sensible” in this context contrasts