Revising the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

This paper examines the position in moral philosophy that Harry Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). The paper first describes the principle as articulated by A.J. Ayer. Subsequently, the paper examines Frankfurt’s critique and proposed revision of the principle and argues that Frankfurt’s proposal relies on an excessively simplistic account of practical reasoning, which fails to account for the possibility of moral dilemmas. In response, the paper offers a further revision of PAP, which accounts for Frankfurt’s critique, moral dilemmas, and the challenge of causal determinism. A highly contested position within moral philosophy and the free will debate is the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), which holds that “a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.”1 At first glance, this principle seems intuitive—it accords with our view that coercion exempts one from moral responsibility. However, PAP is actually quite problematic, as it seems that individuals can be morally responsible for certain actions, even when they could not have done otherwise. In this paper, I will discuss the problems of PAP, explain one prominent proposed revision to the principle, and also offer an alternative position that better accords with our considered moral judgments. This paper proceeds in five sections. I begin by discussing A.J. Ayer’s defense of PAP and articulating the apparent merits of his position. Second, I explain Harry Frankfurt’s well-known challenge to PAP, which I illustrate through counterexamples. Third, I explain Frankfurt’s proposed revision to PAP. Fourth, I criticize Frankfurt’s proposed revision, showing that it presents an excessively simplistic picture of practical reason and thus fails to capture our intuitions about responsibility in moral dilemmas. I suggest an alternate revision that might be more successful. Finally, I address several possible objections to my view. In his “Freedom and Necessity,” A.J. Ayer attempts to save moral responsibility from the challenge of determinism by claiming that moral responsibility requires not freedom from causal determination but rather freedom from constraint.2 First, Ayer denies the relevance of causal determinism to moral responsibility. His argument is as follows: according to those who invoke causal determinism, we are not responsible for our actions if they were determined according to causal laws. At the same time, we are not responsible for our actions if they were not determined according to 1 Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (1969): 829. 2 A.J. Ayer, “Freedom and Necessity,” in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 22. 16 Revising the Principle of Alternate Possibilities causal laws, as such actions must be the result of chance. As such, anyone who attempts to defend moral responsibility by denying the thesis of determinism will fail to defend moral responsibility. As an alternative, then, Ayer tries to tie moral responsibility to a different sort of freedom: freedom from constraint, which implies the existence of alternate possibilities. On this account, an agent B acts freely when the following conditions are met: (1) if B had chosen to act otherwise, she would have done so, (2) B’s action was voluntary insofar as her deliberation was efficacious and not constrained by a psychological abnormality (e.g., kleptomania), and (3) nobody compelled B (e.g., through coercion) to act as she did.3 To this account, the hard determinist might object that condition (1) is insufficient because B is causally determined to choose as she does and thus never could choose to act otherwise. Putting aside this objection, as it does not address the legitimacy of PAP but rather the existence of alternate possibilities, we can see that Ayer’s account is grounded in PAP. The ability to choose and do otherwise, the freedom of one’s deliberation, and the absence of constraint all refer to B’s freedom to choose to ψ rather than to φ, where ψ represents any action aside from φ. When B lacks the freedom to ψ, she is not responsible for φ-ing. Condition (1) would be violated, as B could not ψ even if she chose to. Condition (2) may be violated, if B cannot ψ because of a psychological abnormality. Condition (3) may also be violated, if B’s inability to ψ is a result of another’s coercion. We can thus see the appeal of PAP, insofar as conditions (1), (2), and (3) appear to conform to our intuitions regarding moral responsibility. A failure of any condition appears to exempt B from responsibility. However, Harry Frankfurt poses a robust and effective challenge to PAP, which weakens Ayer’s position. While Frankfurt presents several counterexamples, I will focus on the one that I find most effective. In this example, Black wants Jones to perform a particular action. He is willing to use force in order to ensure that Jones performs this action, but Black chooses not to get involved unless necessary. As it turns out, Jones wants to perform the action that Black desires. Without any knowledge of Black’s presence, Jones performs this action. In this case, Jones could not have done otherwise. Black was ready to use coercion if Jones deviated from the desired course of action. However, Jones shared Black’s desire that this action be performed and thus performed the action independently, without the influence of an external constraint. Here, Ayer’s condition (1) is violated. If Jones had chosen to do otherwise, he would not have been able to do so, as Black would have forcefully intervened. We might say that condition (3) was also violated; Jones was subject to another’s constraint and potential compulsion even though he did not act as to test the constraint. However, Jones is still morally responsible, even though he could not do otherwise. A constraint was in place, but Jones’ action was fully “his own,” so to speak. PAP is thus a flawed principle. Even when an agent cannot do otherwise, she can still be responsible for acting as she does.