Selling Two Goods Optimally
نویسندگان
چکیده
We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer’s values for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional assumptions, we give exact, closed-form formulas for the prices and allocation rule of the optimal selling mechanism. As a side result we give the first example of an optimal mechanism in an i.i.d. setting over a support of the form [0, b] which is not deterministic. Since our framework is based on duality techniques, we were also able to demonstrate how slightly relaxed versions of it can still be used to design mechanisms that have very good approximation ratios with respect to the optimal revenue, through a “convexification” process.
منابع مشابه
Selling or Leasing? Pricing Information Goods with Depreciation of Consumer Valuation
Should a monopolistic vendor adopt the selling model or the leasing model for information goods or services? We study this question in the context of consumer valuation depreciation. Using a two-period game-theoretic model, we consider two types of consumer-side valuation depreciation for information goods or services: vintage depreciation and individual depreciation. Vintage depreciation assum...
متن کاملAn Optimal Coalition Formation among Buyer Agents Based on a Genetic Algorithm
Group buying is a form of electronic commerce that is growing quickly. There are many group buying sites on the Internet. Group buying is a commercial transaction in which the unit price of goods changes with the number of buyers, and a buyer can purchase goods at a low price if many buyers participate in group buying. There are several group-buying sites that are selling similar (or the same) ...
متن کاملThe Better Half of Selling Separately
Separate selling of two independent goods is shown to yield at least 62% of the optimal revenue, and at least 73% when the goods satisfy the Myerson regularity condition. This improves the 50% result of Hart and Nisan (2017, originally circulated in 2012).
متن کاملBest foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?
Should an informed seller of multiple goods sell the best goods first to make a favorable impression on buyers, or instead wait until buyers have learned more from earlier sales? To help answer this question we consider the sequential auction of two goods by a seller with private information about their values. We find that the seller’s sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation in ...
متن کاملProbabilistic Goods: A Creative Way of Selling Products and Services
T paper defines a unique type of product or service offering, termed probabilistic goods, and analyzes a novel selling strategy, termed probabilistic selling (PS). A probabilistic good is not a concrete product or service but an offer involving a probability of getting any one of a set of multiple distinct items. Under the probabilistic selling strategy, a multi-item seller creates probabilisti...
متن کامل