Voters’private valuation of candidates’quality∗

We propose a generalization of the model of electoral competition between two candidates who differ in non-policy characteristics that allows voters to have heterogeneous and private valuations of these characteristics. Unlike models in which voters’valuations of such non-policy characteristics are common and common knowledge and which never admit pure strategy equilibria, in our setup we show existence of both converging and mildly diverging pure strategy equilibria. Perhaps more importantly, we uncover a non-monotonic (U-shaped) relationship between the extent of heterogeneity of voters’ preferences in the issue of candidates’non-policy characteristics and the maximum degree of equilibrium platform differentiation. Our analysis a) sheds new light on how a small (large) expected degree of heterogeneity in the voters’ preferences on the candidates’ non-policy characteristics may lead to a depoliticized (politicized) vote and b) demonstrates that as voters become more heterogeneous in this issue, existence of pure strategy equilibria becomes more likely.