How Can Governments Borrow so Much?

نویسندگان

  • Michel A. Habib
  • Jean-Charles Rochet
  • Ibrahim Guney
چکیده

We analyze the determinants of government debt under the twin assumptions that governments have limited horizons and default only when government income falls short of debt service requirements. We derive a government’s maximum sustainable debt ratio, that is, the debt ratio chosen by a myopic government whose horizon does not extend beyond its current term in office. Maximum sustainable debt varies across countries, consistent with Reinhart, Rogoff, and Sevastano’s (2003) evidence of different countries’ differing debt (in)tolerance. Actual debt ratios are below their maximum sustainable levels, as governments seeking further terms in office fear debt-induced default that may jeopardize their prospects for reelection. The difference between actual and maximum sustainable debt ratios creates a ‘margin of safety’ that allows governments to increase debt if necessary with little corresponding increase in default risk. The probability of default climbs precipitously once the margin of safety has been exhausted.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Decentralized Borrowing and Centralized Default

In the past, foreign borrowing by developing countries was comprised almost entirely of government borrowing. Recently, private firms and individuals in developing countries borrow substantially from foreign lenders. It is not clear whether the observed increase in private sector borrowing leads to overborrowing and frequent defaults by governments in developing countries. In this paper, we dev...

متن کامل

Reputation Spillover Across Relationships: Reviving Reputation Models of Debt

A traditional explanation for why sovereign governments repay debts is that they want to keep good reputations so they can easily borrow more. Bulow and Rogoff show that this argument is invalid under two conditions: (i) there is a single debt relationship, and (ii) regardless of their past actions, governments can earn the (possibly state-contingent) market rate of return by saving abroad. Bul...

متن کامل

Can governments ever censor the web? A Literature Survey

The web creates creates unique challenges and opportunities for governments wishing to censor content. The following annotated bibliography will present a range of disciplinary approaches to aspects of this phenomenon. As the papers collected here indicate, government censorship of the web already exists to a high degree in many countries. Therefore the question is not so much whether governmen...

متن کامل

New Currency, New Constraints? the Euro and Government-financial Market Relations

How does the advent of EMU affect the nature of financial market-government relations? I begin by reviewing the argument that developed-nation governments retain room to move in the face of financial globalization. I then consider the recent implications of EMU for this argument. Membership in EMU restricts governments fiscal and monetary policymaking autonomy, but it also may change their trea...

متن کامل

Who Borrows? Political Inclusiveness and the Accumulation of Foreign Debt in Developing Societies

Why do some developing country governments accumulate large foreign debts while others do not? I hypothesize that variation in foreign borrowing is a function of variation in the breadth of public participation in the political process. Specifically, governments borrow less when political institutions enable broad public participation in the political process and encourage the revelation of inf...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2013