Cooperation via Communication: Supporting Social Norms with Costly Messages
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper shows that if interaction is not anonymous then costly messages can establish a folk theorem in repeated matching games. This result holds for all population sizes and a broad class of matching rules including many choice based rules. Cooperation is achieved through a formalization of a referencestrategy.
منابع مشابه
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