Taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choices

نویسنده

  • JOHN P. CONLEY
چکیده

We examine a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding. The main innovation is that we assume that the crowding effects of agents are a result of choices that agents make. For example, agents may be crowded (positively or negatively) by the skills that other members of their jurisdiction possess and these skills may be acquired through utility maximizing educational investment choices made in response to equilibrium wages and educational costs. In such an environment, we show that taste-homogeneous jurisdictions are optimal. This contrasts with results for both the standard differentiated crowding model and the crowding types model. We also show that the core and equilibrium are equivalent, and that decentralization is possible through anonymous prices having a structure similar to cost–share equilibrium prices.  1996 Academic Press Limited

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تاریخ انتشار 1996