Core Discussion Paper 2001/49 on Strategic Complementarity Conditions in Bertrand Oligopoly

نویسندگان

  • Rabah AMIR
  • Isabel GRILO
چکیده

For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single counterexample that: (i) A new monotone transformation of the firms’ profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations both fail, and (ii) Topkis’s notion of critical sufficient condition for monotonicity of a Bertrand firm’s best-reply correspondence cannot be extended to rely only on positive unit costs. JEL Codes: C72, D43, L13.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

From Bertrand to Cournot via Kreps and Scheinkman : a hazardous journey Xavier

The mininal core of strategic decisions a firm has to make is three-fold: What to produce? At which scale? At what price? A full-fledged theory of oligopolistic competition should be able to embrace these three dimensions jointly. Starting from the Cournot-Bertrand dispute and the stream of research it gave birth to, this survey shows that we are far from having such a theory at our disposal to...

متن کامل

On the COalitiOnal Stability Of MOnOpOly pOwer in DifferentiateD bertranD anD COurnOt OligOpOlieS Documents de travail GREDEG GREDEG Working Papers Series

In this article we revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition in the presence of a cartel of firms that faces outsiders acting individually. This competition setting enables to deal with both non-cooperative and cooperative oligopoly games. We concentrate on industries consisting of symmetrically differentiated products where firms operate at a constant and identica...

متن کامل

Coalition Formation in Games without synergies

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the ”coalition unanimity” game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs of the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated ...

متن کامل

FS IV 01 – 24 The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly* by Roman Inderst and Christian Wey This paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand o...

متن کامل

Games with strategic complementarities: New applications to industrial organization

This paper provides an introduction to the analysis of games with strategic complementarities and applications to industrial organization: oligopoly pricing, comparative statics and a taxonomy of strategic behavior in two-stage games. D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; L13

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2001