Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders. This research project has been partially funded through the projects labeled TIN200804547 and DPI2011-24929, and BR10/18 Scholarship of the University of Girona granted to Albert Pla.
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