Defending Logical Pluralism

Formalising Semantic Information Lessons from Logical Pluralism

By introducing the notion of logical pluralism, it can be concluded that up to now theories of semantic information have at least implicitly relied on logical monism, the view that there is one true logic. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we ought to ask whether logical pluralism could entail informational pluralism. The basic insights from logical pluralism and t...

pluralism and proofs

Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism [2] characterises pluralism about logical consequence in terms of the different ways cases can be selected in the analysis of logical consequence as preservation of truth over a class of cases. This is not the only way to understand or to motivate pluralism about logical consequence. Here, I will examine pluralism about logical consequence in terms of diffe...

Logical Pluralism and the Preservation of Warrant

I defend logical pluralism against the charge that One True Logic is motivated by considerations of warrant transfer. On the way I attempt to clarify just a little the connections between deductive validity and epistemology.

Carnap’s Tolerance, Language Change and Logical Pluralism

In this paper, I distinguish different kinds of pluralism about logical consequence. In particular, I distinguish the pluralism about logic arising from Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance from a pluralism which maintains that there are different, equally “good” logical consequence relations on the one language. I will argue that this second form of pluralism does more justice to the contemporary s...

Adaptive Logics as a Necessary Tool for Relative Rationality. Including a Section on Logical Pluralism