Peer-to-Peer multimedia sharing based on social norms

Designing incentive schemes for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) multimedia sharing applications, where the participating peers find it in their self-interest to contribute resources rather than to “free-ride”, is challenging due to the unique features exhibited by such networks: large populations of anonymous peers interacting infrequently, asymmetric interests of peers, network errors, multiple concurrent transactions, low-cost implementation requirements etc. In this paper, to address these challenges, we design and rigorously analyze a new family of incentive protocols that utilizes social norms. In the proposed protocols, each peer maintains a reputation reflecting its past behaviors in the P2P system (i.e. whether the peers have followed or not the social strategy prescribed by the social norm), and the social norm rewards and punishes peers depending on their reputations. We first define the concept of a sustainable social norm, under which no peer has an incentive to deviate from the social strategy prescribed by the protocol. We then formulate the problem of designing optimal social norms, which selects the social norm that maximizes the network performance among all sustainable social norms. In particular, we prove that, given the P2P network and peers’ characteristics, social norms can be designed such that it becomes in the self-interest of peers to contribute their contents to the network rather than to free-ride. We also investigate the impact of various punishment schemes on the social welfare as well as how should the optimal social norms be designed if altruistic and malicious peers are active in the network. Our results show that optimal social norms are capable of deterring free-riding behaviors and providing significant improvements in the sharing efficiency of multimedia P2P networks. KeywordsMultimedia sharing, Peer-to-Peer networks, Incentive design, Indirect reciprocity, Social norms, Reputation schemes.