Using Author Topic to Detect Insider Threats from Email Traffic
نویسندگان
چکیده
Despite a technology bias which focuses on external electronic threats, insiders pose the greatest threat to commercial and government organizations. One means of preventing insider theft is by stopping potential insiders from becoming actual thieves. In most cases, individuals do not begin work at an organization with the intent of doing harm. Instead, over time something changes resulting in their becoming an insider threat. By detecting warning signs it is possible to discover potential insiders before they become actual insiders. Using the Author Topic [1] clustering algorithm, we discern employees interests from their daily emails. These interests provide a means to create two social networks that are used to locate potential insiders by finding individuals who either (1) feel alienated from the organization (a key warning sign of a possible disgruntled worker) or (2) have a hidden interest in a sensitive( e.g. proprietary or classified) topic. In both cases, this is revealed when someone demonstrates an interest in a topic but does not share that interest with anyone in the organization. The dataset used for this research is the Enron email corpus. Unlike most organizations, Enron has a known whistleblower, Sherron Watkins, who was considered an insider threat by her boss, Andy Fastow, who was engaged in the illegal business practices [2]. The first step of the research resolves the Enron email into a collection of stemmed words and frequency counts (i.e. the number of times each word and each individual occurs in each email). These frequency counts are then fed into Author Topic producing four probability distributions: the probability of a word given a topic (p(w|z)), the probability of an individual given a topic (p(u|z)), the probability of a topic (p(z)) and the probability of a topic given a document (p(z|d)). The second step creates two social networks for each topic. The first, the implicit interest network, is constructed by linking individuals who have shown an interest in the topic. An individual has an interest in a topic if the conditional probability for an individual (p(u|z)) is 1.64 standard deviations above average conditional probability for that topic. The second, the explicit email network, is constructed by linking individuals who have passed an email related to that ? The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government
منابع مشابه
Using PLSI-U to detect insider threats by datamining e-mail
Despite a technology bias that focuses on external electronic threats, insiders pose the greatest threat to an organisation. This paper discusses an approach to assist investigators in identifying potential insider threats. We discern employees interests from e-mail using an extended version of PLSI. These interests are transformed into implicit and explicit social network graphs, which are use...
متن کاملAddressing Insider Threats and Information Leakage
Insider threats are one of the problems of organizational security that are most difficult to handle. It is often unclear whether or not an actor is an insider, or what we actually mean by “insider”. It also is often impossible to determine whether an insider action is permissible, or whether it constitutes an insider attack. From a technical standpoint, the biggest concern is the discriminatio...
متن کاملUsing Internet Activity Profiling for Insider-threat Detection
The insider-threat problem continues to be a major risk to both public and private sectors, where those people who have privileged knowledge and access choose to abuse this in some way to cause harm towards their organisation. To combat against this, organisations are beginning to invest heavily in deterrence monitoring tools to observe employees’ activity, such as computer access, Internet bro...
متن کاملA Probabilistic Analysis Framework for Malicious Insider Threats
Malicious insider threats are difficult to detect and to mitigate. Many approaches for explaining behaviour exist, but there is little work to relate them to formal approaches to insider threat detection. In this work we present a general formal framework to perform analysis for malicious insider threats, based on probabilistic modelling, verification, and synthesis techniques. The framework fi...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Digital Investigation
دوره 4 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006