The Importance of Popper's Theories to Psychology

The problem of Psychology's Two Cultures" is described by Kimble (August 1984). who found evidence for the existence of "scientific" andY "humanistic" cultures within the profession, measured b' individual responses on a number of questions designed to force choices between various methods of apl*oach. This division, like that between Snow's (1964) "two cultures." the sciences and the humanities, is an artifact produced by a false theory of scientific knowledge. This theory assumes that knowledge grows by a process labeled induLlion. which involves either the accumulation of facts or the formulation of statements about laws after the repeated observation of regularities in the world. The effects of this theory linger on. although it is commonly accepted that the notion of incrementa(gro'.vth based on observations vas destroyed by T. S. Kuhn's (1962) historical research. In fact, the theory of induction and the whole program of the ViennaCircle of logical positivists were destroyed by Karl Popper(l934. 1959). Popper proposed a theory of conjectural objective knowledge that grows by a process of trial and error, controlled by imaginative criticism and empirical tests. This theory disposes of all the "conflicts" postulated by Kimble and by C. P. Snow (1964). Consider the dimension observation v. intuition. This dichotomy can be resolved by realizing that there are numerous sources of knowledge (tradition. observation. imagination, mathematical and logical deduction from premises) but that none of these provides anything like a certain base or a criterion of truth. Regarding the setting of discover posed as a dichotomy between field and laboratory, the type of tests or observations that are planned should depend on the theories under investigation. Sonic theories are best tested in the field: others are best or most easily tested indoors. This is not a conflict: it is simply a matter of using different tools to do ditkrent jobs. When Popper's ideas are understood, there can indeed be an epistemic armistice between the two cultures, although both sides will need to modify some assumptions that they currently share. Because the' are shared, they are not subjected to criticism and are probably not even noticed. An example of such an assumption is the theory that we should look for a secure or certain basis for our knowledge (for criticisms of this, see the introduction to Popper. 1963: and Bartle 1964. 1982). Krasner and Houts (1984) studied a group of behavior modificationists and a control group, using questionnaires to force responses on a number of variables under three headings: theoretical orienicition (e.g.. factual v. theoretical orientation and determinisrn). epistenu lugical sir/c (em pincism. rationalism, and metaphorism). and values (having to do with politics. religion, and life-style). Systematic differences turned up between the two groups on the methodological and epistemological variables but not on the dimension of values. Despite this result, the authors suggested that psychology is not value free. This notion is difficult to support If a distinction is drawn between two types of theories that are not testable. These are usually confused, especially by people who assume that a statement must be either a matter of fact or a matter of value. However, a distinction can be made between theories of method and theories of value. Theories of method are components of what Popper (1976. I 982b) called the 'metaphysical research programme." These programs consist of clusters of ideas, seldom clearly articulated or subjected to critical discussion, that regulate the formulation of problems and dictate the type of answers that are sought. Among the ideas in these programs arc theories about determinism, reductionism, and epistemolog. This is the area of tiworetiecil orientation and c/list einologi cal stance in which Krasner and Flouts found interesting and important differences between their groups. Theories of value are quite distinct from the theories of method and epistemology in the metaphysical research program. Moral values can guide the selection of research projects and certainly should regulate the application of findings. Important as they are (for scientists as for everyone else). these values have no logical place in the structure of descriptive theories. In this area ofgenuine moral and political values. Krasner and Hotits found no systematic differences between their two groups. Similarly, they found only weak relationships between values and the other variables. So far as moral values and the social responsibilities of psychologists are concerned, scientists have special moral responsibilities just to the extent that they have either special knowledge or special power (Popper, 1969). Modern science, including psychology, is dominated by research programs containing the theories of learning by induction. subjectivism. reductionism. and determinism. Popper (1972. l982a. 1982b, l9S3; Popper & Eccles. 1977) has argued that these should be replaced by the method of "conjecture and refutation." and by the theories of objective knowledge. emergence and nondeterminism. Most critiques of traditional empiricist methods depend heavily on flogging the dead horse of jogical positivism. a beast that should have been defunct from the time of Popper's criticism in the early 1930s. Unfortunately this criticism has not et been fully appreciated either b positivists or by their critics. Even after Kimble's (1984) problems of method and the issues of values are sorted out, psychology still has some deep theoretical dilemmas to consider. The practical aspect of the situation is expressed by Bruner (1983). who lamented that psychology, which should have so much to say about human behavior, in fact has hardly made. an impact on the commonsense life of ordinary people, or on matters of jurisprudence. economics, or social policy. Chomsky (1974) posed the conceptual problem: