Some Thoughts on the Traveler’s Dilemma

نویسنده

  • Guillaume Alain
چکیده

In this paper, we will discuss the traveler’s dilemma, a problem famous for its ability to point out how theoretical results of game theory don’t always translate properly into real life applications. We explore the paradox of rational agents being outperformed by agents playing randomly and explain what is the problem with backward induction. We comment on the results obtained by [CGGH99] when carrying out the experiment with real subjects and argue that their modeling of the decision mechanism with randomness may lead to a reasonable fit with the experimental data, but it is of no real use. We point out how the game could be modified by adding randomness in a slightly different fashion to shift away the Nash equilibrium from its lose-lose position. Finally, we show how a simple mechanism of natural selection can provide insight into why people in real life don’t play as “rational” agents and are influenced by the reward parameter.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Traveler’s Dilemma

In the game called Traveler’s Dilemma, the standard game theoretic analysis cannot explain why people choose to play the strictly dominated strategy of the game except by saying that they are not maximizing their expected payoff, i.e. acting irrationally. In this paper, we look at how people might choose to play irrationally.

متن کامل

Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept

For some well-known games, such as the Traveler’s Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional gametheoretic solution concepts—most notably Nash equilibrium—predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. We introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, i...

متن کامل

Iterated Regret Minimization: A More Realistic Solution Concept

For some well-known games, such as the Traveler’s Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts—and most notably Nash equilibrium—predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. In this paper, we introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many ...

متن کامل

Playing Challenging Iterated Two-Person Games Well: A Case Study on the Iterated Traveler’s Dilemma

We study an interesting 2-player game known as the Iterated Traveler’s Dilemma, a non-zero sum game in which there is a large number of possible actions in each round and therefore an astronomic number of possible strategies overall. What makes the Iterated TD particularly interesting is that it defies the usual prescriptions of classical game theory insofar as what constitutes an “optimal” str...

متن کامل

Experts Playing the Traveler’s Dilemma

We analyze a one-shot experiment on the traveler’s dilemma in which members of the Game Theory Society, were asked to submit both a (possibly mixed) strategy and their belief concerning the average strategy of their opponents. Very few entrants expect and play the unique Nash equilibrium, while we observe a fifth playing the cooperative solution of the game, i. e. a strictly dominated strategy....

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008