Truth and probability in evolutionary games
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper concerns two composite Lewis-Skyrms signaling games. Each consists in a base game that evolves a language descriptive of nature and a metagame that coevolves a language descriptive of the base game and its evolving language. The first composite game shows how a pragmatic notion of truth might coevolve with a simple descriptive language. The second shows how a pragmatic notion of probability might similarly coevolve. Each of these pragmatic notions is characterized by the particular game and role that it comes to play in the game.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell.
دوره 29 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017