Should genetically modified organisms be patentable?

In this paper we examine some of the philosophical issues involved in patenting genetically modified organisms. In particular, what we think has been highly problematic has been the tendency to use terms such as intervention, identification, creation, authorship and artifact interchangeably as criteria for invention. We examine attempts by various people to formulate a philosophically precise set of criteria for patents over genetically modified material. While we welcome these attempts to increase the philosophical sophistication in this area, we will be arguing that they are unsatisfactory. In particular, we will be arguing that the criterion of being an artifact is mistaken for drawing the normative line for patentability. In passing we will also note our belief that other distinctions between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ objects, and living and not-living or animate and inanimate objects are unlikely to be helpful in drawing a normative line. Our qualified conclusion is that genetically modified organisms are not inventions and should not be eligible for standard patent protection.