Uncertain Congestion Games with Assorted Human Agent Populations

Congestion games model a wide variety of real-world resource congestion problems, such as selfish network routing, traffic route guidance in congested areas, taxi fleet optimization and crowd movement in busy areas. However, existing research in congestion games assumes: (a) deterministic movement of agents between resources; and (b) perfect rationality (i.e. maximizing their own expected value) of all agents. Such assumptions are not reasonable in dynamic domains where decision support has to be provided to humans. For instance, in optimizing the performance of a taxi fleet serving a city, movement of taxis can be involuntary or nondeterministic (decided by the specific customer who hires the taxi) and more importantly, taxi drivers may not follow advice provided by the decision support system (due to bounded rationality of humans). To that end, we contribute: (a) a general framework for representing congestion games under uncertainty for populations with assorted notions of rationality. (b) a scalable approach for solving the decision problem for perfectly rational agents which are in the mix with boundedly rational agents; and (c) a detailed evaluation on a synthetic and realworld data set to illustrate the usefulness of our new approach with respect to key social welfare metrics in the context of an assorted human-agent population. An interesting result from our experiments on a real-world taxi fleet optimization problem is that it is better (in terms of revenue and operational efficiency) for taxi drivers to follow perfectly rational strategies irrespective of the percentage of drivers not following the advice.