An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property

This paper is a revised version of TI-discussion paper 8-95-249, \ An axiomatization of the Shapley value using component eeciency and fairness". I would like to thank Gerard van der Laan and Eric van Damme for useful remarks on a previous draft of this paper. Financial support from the Netherlands organization for scientiic research (NWO) ESR-grant 510-01-0504 is gratefully acknowledged. Abstract In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payoos change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by this fairness property, eeciency and the null player property. These three axioms also characterize the Shapley value on important subclasses of games, such as the class of simple games or the class of apex games.