Cross-layer distributed power control: a repeated game formulation to improve the sum energy efficiency

The main objective of this work is to improve the energy-efficiency (EE) of a multiple access channel (MAC) system, through power control, in a distributed manner. In contrast with many existing works on energy-efficient power control, which ignore the possible presence of a queue at the transmitter, we consider a new generalized cross-layer EE metric. This approach is relevant when the transmitters have a non-zero energy cost even when the radiated power is zero and takes into account the presence of a finite packet buffer and packet arrival at the transmitter. As the Nash equilibrium (NE) is an energy-inefficient solution, the present work aims at overcoming this deficit M. Mhiri SERCOM Laboratory, Tunisia Polytechnic School, P.B. 743-2078, La Marsa, Tunisia E-mail: [email protected] V. S. Varma Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore E-mail: [email protected] K. Cheikhrouhou SERCOM Laboratory, Tunisia Polytechnic School, P.B. 743-2078, La Marsa, Tunisia E-mail: [email protected] S. Lasaulce L2S CNRS SUPELEC, 91192 Gif-sur-Yvette, University of Paris-Sud, France E-mail: [email protected] A. Samet EMT Centre INRS University, Ouest Montréal (Québec), H5A 1K6, Canada E-mail: [email protected] 2 M. Mhiri, V. S. Varma, K. Cheikhrouhou, S. Lasaulce and A. Samet by improving the global energy-efficiency. Indeed, as the considered system has multiple agencies each with their own interest, the performance metric reflecting the individual interest of each decision maker is the global energy-efficiency defined then as the sum over individual energy-efficiencies. Repeated games (RG) are investigated through the study of two dynamic games (finite RG and discounted RG), whose equilibrium is defined when introducing a new operating point (OP), Pareto-dominating the NE and relying only on individual channel state information (CSI). Accordingly, closed-form expressions of the minimum number of stages of the game for finite RG (FRG) and the maximum discount factor of the discounted RG (DRG) were established. Our contributions consist of improving the system performances in terms of powers and utilities when using the new OP compared to the NE and the Nash bargaining (NB) solution. Moreover, the cross-layer model in the RG formulation leads to achieving a shorter minimum number of stages in the FRG even for higher number of users. In addition, the social welfare (sum of utilities) in the DRG decreases slightly with the cross-layermodel when the number of users increases while it is reduced considerably with the Goodman model. Finally, we show that in real systems with random packet arrivals, the cross-layer power control algorithm outperforms the Goodman algorithm.