Perturbed zero-sum games with applications to dynamic games

نویسندگان

  • Eitan ALTMAN
  • Eugene A. FEINBERG
  • Vladimir A. GAITSGORY
چکیده

This paper deals with perturbed matrix games. The main result is that the sets of solutions of perturbed games converge to subsets of solutions of appropriate lexicographic games. We consider applications of these results to dynamic games. In particular, we consider applications to repeated games with weighted discounted criteria and to finite-horizon stochastic games with perturbed transition probabilities and rewards.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

A TRANSITION FROM TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES TO COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS

In this paper, we deal with games with fuzzy payoffs. We proved that players who are playing a zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs against Nature are able to increase their joint payoff, and hence their individual payoffs by cooperating. It is shown that, a cooperative game with the fuzzy characteristic function can be constructed via the optimal game values of the zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff...

متن کامل

Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games

The purpose of this survey is to describe some recent advances in zero-sum repeated games and in particular new connections to differential games. Topics include: approachability, asymptotic analysis: recursive formula and operator approach, dual game and incomplete information, uniform approach.

متن کامل

Dynamic system of strategic games

Maybe an event can't be modeled completely through one game but there is more chance with several games. With emphasis on players' rationality, we present new properties of strategic games, which result in production of other games. Here, a new attitude to modeling will be presented in game theory as dynamic system of strategic games and its some applications such as analysis of the clash betwe...

متن کامل

A Dijkstra-Type Algorithm for Dynamic Games

We study zero-sum dynamic games with deterministic transitions and alternating moves of the players. Player 1 aims at reaching a terminal set and minimising a running and final cost. We propose and analyse an algorithm that computes the value function of these games extending Dijkstra’s algorithm for shortest paths on graphs. We also show the connection of these games with numerical schemes for...

متن کامل

A Zero-Sum Stochastic Game with Compact Action Sets and no Asymptotic Value

We give an example of a zero-sum stochastic game with four states, compact action sets for each player, and continuous payoff and transition functions, such that the discounted value does not converge as the discount factor tends to 0, and the value of the n−stage game does not converge as n goes to infinity.

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2005