The Knowability Paradox in the light of a Logic for Pragmatics
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument showing that if all truths are knowable in principle, then all truths are, in fact, known. Many strategies have been suggested in order to avoid the paradoxical conclusion. A family of solutions – called logical revision – has been proposed to solve the paradox, revising the logic underneath, with an intuitionistic revision included. In this paper, we focus on socalled revisionary solutions to the paradox – solutions that put the blame on the underlying logic. Specifically, we analyse a possibile translation of the paradox into a modified intuitionistic fragment of a logic for pragmatics (KILP) inspired by Dalla Pozza and Garola in 1995. Our aim is to understand if KILP is a candidate for the logical revision of the paradox and to compare it with the standard intuitionistic solution to the paradox.
منابع مشابه
The Knowability Paradox: does logic come before metaphysics?
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument which states that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are actually known. In 1963 Frederich Fitch published ‘A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts’[3]. This brief article appeared on the Journal of Symbolic Logic and it immediately became a classic of philosophical logic. It is in this paper that Fitch presented the Knowability Paradox, ...
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