Pooling with Essential and Nonessential Patents<xref ref-type="fn" rid="f1" ptype="fmic6123" citart="citart1"><sup></sup></xref>
نویسنده
چکیده
Several recent technological standards were accompanied by patent pools—arrangements to license relevant intellectual property as a package. A key distinction made by regulators—between patents essential to a standard and patents with substitutes—has not been addressed in the theoretical literature. I show that pools of essential patents are always welfare increasing, while pools which include nonessential patents can be welfare reducing—even pools limited to complementary patents and stable under compulsory individual licensing. If pools gain commitment power and price as Stackelberg leaders, this reduces, and can reverse, the gains from welfareincreasing pools. (JEL D43, D45, K21, L13, L24, O34)
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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
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