The Hawk-dove Game and the Evolution of Lethal Fighting
نویسنده
چکیده
The notion of a game seems to conjure up a vision of light-hearted contestants engaged in the pleasant pursuit of recreation. While some human games have this quality, animal contests do not. Often, combatants inflict severe injury. Certainly in contests between countries, war is a less desirable form of “conflict resolution”, compared to the more peaceful solution of diplomacy. Are there analogies that can be drawn between human gaming, conflict, and conflict resolution that we can apply to animal behavior?
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