F I N K I N G F R a N K F U R T

1. Laertes is about to stab Hamlet. Claudius, watching from the wings, desperately wants Laertes to stab Hamlet and has implanted a device in Laertes’ brain that, if activated, will force him to stab Hamlet. Claudius intends to activate the device if it appears that Laertes will change his mind at the last moment. Laertes, however, stabs Hamlet of his own accord and Claudius’s device is never activated. By appealing to examples such as this, Harry Frankfurt (1969) presents a powerful objection to the view that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise (the principle of alternative possibilities, or PAP). Frankfurt’s argument relies on two claims: firstly, that Laertes is responsible for stabbing Hamlet and secondly, that Laertes lacks the ability not to do so. The former claim seems obviously true. The latter claim is, however, more controversial. In particular, the latter claim depends on how ‘ability’ is understood. In this paper, we shall discuss an analysis of ability in terms of agents’ dispositions. Relying on a dispositional analysis of ability, Michael Smith (1997, 2003) has argued that agents in Frankfurt examples, such as Laertes, should be thought of as possessing the ability to do otherwise, contra Frankfurt. We will grant that Smith is right about agents such as Laertes, but argue that another classic Frankfurt case evades Smith’s analysis. Frankfurt’s willing addict (1971), in particular, cannot be shown, on Smith’s account, to possess the ability to do otherwise. Provided one shares the intuition that the willing addict is indeed responsible, our argument suggests that Smith fails, ultimately, in his defence of PAP. We do not intend to argue here that no account is available according to which the willing addict possesses the ability to do otherwise. We will only argue that no dispositional account is available. Nevertheless, if we are right, the burden of proof will fall on the defender of PAP to provide an account that does not, however tacitly, rely on dispositions.