No Luck With Knowledge? On A Dogma Of Epistemology
نویسنده
چکیده
Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a certain, interesting kind). This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lucky” in that sense. In the second part, I look at philosophical conceptions of luck (modal and probabilistic ones) and come to the conclusion that knowledge can be lucky in those senses, too. I also turns out that a probabilistic notion of luck can help us see in what ways a particular piece of knowledge or belief can be lucky or not lucky. The relation between knowledge and mere true belief which does not amount to knowledge has long kept philosophers busy. A number of authors hold that non-accidental true belief is knowledge (cf., e.g., Unger 1970, 114-115). Whatever one might think about that, there is widespread consensus that there cannot be any lucky knowledge. Or: Knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely, a belief which is true only by luck cannot
منابع مشابه
Anti-luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief
Two common theses in contemporary epistemology are that 'knowl-edge excludes luck' and that knowledge depends on 'purely epistemic' factors. In this essay, I shall argue as follows: given some plausible assumptions, 'anti-luck epistemology,' which is committed to the fi rst thesis, implies the falsity of the second thesis. That is, I will argue that anti-luck epistemology leads to what has been...
متن کاملAnti-luck (too Weak) Virtue Epistemology
Duncan Pritchard (et al. 2010, 2012a, 2012b) has recently shifted his view from an account that primarily understands knowledge in terms of the safety principle (a view mainly developed in his 2005 monograph on epistemic luck) to an ‘impure’ variety of virtue epistemology, which combines the safety principle with a weakened virtue-theoretic condition, a view that he calls anti-luck virtue epist...
متن کاملSensitivity, Safety, and Anti-luck Epistemology
This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.
متن کاملAnti-luck Virtue Epistemology
It is argued that there are two ‘master’ intuitions about knowledgean anti-luck intuition and an ability intuitionand that these impose distinct epistemic demands. It is claimed that recognising this fact leads one towards a new proposal in the theory of knowledgeanti-luck virtue epistemologywhich can avoid the problems that afflict other theories of knowledge. This proposal is motivated in...
متن کاملA Counterexample to the Robust and Anti-luck Virtue Epistemologies
This paper begins with an introduction to four different prominent versions of process reliabilism about knowledge, namely, the simple K-reliabilism, John Greco’s robust virtue epistemology, Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, and the Goldmanian Kreliabilism. Its main objective is to offer a counterexample, namely, the fewer barn façades case, to the anti-luck virtue epistemology,...
متن کامل