Bounded Rationality in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
نویسنده
چکیده
In diverse fields such as computer science, economics and psychology, bounded rationality has emerged as an important research topic. Models which assume the existence of perfectly rational agents seem inadequate for many realworld problems where agents often lack perfect rationality. Classes of imperfect rationality include the conditions of incomplete knowledge, memory, information or computational ability. In this paper, bounded rationality is investigated in the context of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). Six papers are surveyed which address issues of optimality and cooperation in repeated games with applications to IPD, using either a machine learning or game theory approach. Each paper imposes some bound on players’ rationality; these approaches to bounding are classified and compared based on their results and applicability.
منابع مشابه
Rationality and bounded information in repeated games, with application to the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Actions in a repeated game can in principle depend on all previous outcomes. Given this vast policy space, human players may often be forced to use heuristics that base actions on incomplete information, such as the outcomes of only the most recent trials. Here it is proven that such bounded rationality is often fully rational, in that the optimal policy based on some limited information about ...
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