Online Appendix to "Effi cient Ex-Ante Stabilization of Firms"
نویسنده
چکیده
This is the online appendix to Frankel [48]. It consists of the omitted formal results and proofs that underlie the extensions discussed in section 3 of that paper. Section 7 studies the case of large noise; section 8 (p. 12) studies a two-period learning model; and section 9 (p. 21) studies a model of duopoly competition. In order to avoid ambiguity, numbering of sections, footnotes, and results in this paper continues where Frankel [48] ends. Bibliographic items that do not appear in this document may be found in Frankel [48].
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