Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents

There is a growing literature arguing that certain entities embodied by groups of agents—certain “collectives”—themselves qualify as agents; even, some say, as moral agents. These are ambitious claims. To be agents, such entities must be capable of acting on the basis of their own beliefs, desires, and intentions. To be moral agents, subject to moral obligations and accountable for their actions, they should presumably also be capable of acting freely in some relevant sense, and of recognizing and acting on moral considerations, including the respect owed to others. In addition to this, it might seem that to be fully fledged moral agents—fitting targets of a wide range of moral assessments and reactions—they must be capable of certain reactive attitudes, in particular those of guilt and indignation. Such agents must be able to understand when they have done wrong, and that they are accountable for their actions. At least in non-parasitic cases, this