Are There Material Objects in Bohm ’ s Theory ?

Bedard (1999) argues that “Bohm’s interpretation is not as classical as it initially appears” (p. 223) and that, in particular, the common view that the pilot-wave theory can get by with an ontology of just particles “do[es] not make sense” (ibid.). Indeed, “sets of Bohmian particles do not have all the intrinsic properties necessary to constitute a material object” (ibid.). This last remark is the heart of Bedard’s impressive paper, the point being that the ‘minimalist’ interpretation of the pilot-wave theory (according to which the only entities are the particles, and their only fundamental property position) has no account of material objects. In this note, I shall suggest that in fact the minimalist’s interpretation is fully adequate. Bedard shows that the minimalist’s physical world (consisting of just particles with position) is too sparse to explain why, for example, Louis de Broglie (1924) formulated essentially the same theory that Bohm (1952) did. An examination of his dissertation reveals that in fact his theory was much closer to Bohm’s than is usually assumed. I have chosen, therefore, to use the ‘neutral’ term ‘pilot-wave theory’.