The Political Economy of the Market for Corporate control in France and the Hamstrung Harmonisation

This paper focuses on the EU Takeover Directive and the impact of its transposition into French law. Takeover regulation is employed as a test case in assessing the importance of the EU in inducing harmonisation within European varieties of capitalism. French outcomes diverge from EC aspirations for greater clarity and uniformity. Heightened uncertainty and differentiation exacerbate problems of asymmetric vulnerability of member states (and their firms) which hinders EU-level harmonisation of varieties of capitalism and corporate governance. In the French case, transposition involved departures from liberal norms (consistent with the Takeover Directive’s ambitions) which had prevailed before. As a result of the directive, a more confused and varied European takeover picture has emerged. Instead of the desired greater clarity and uniformity regarding takeover regulations and processes, there is heightened uncertainty and differentiation.