Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning
نویسنده
چکیده
In a model of incomplete, heterogeneous information, with externalities and strategic interactions, we analyze the possibility of adaptive learning to act as coordination device. We build on the framework introduced by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and extend it to a dynamic setting where agents need to learn to coordinate. We analyze conditions under which learning obtains, and show that adaptive learning makes agents converge to the game theoretical, strategic equilibrium. Key words: Learning, heterogeneity, interaction, coordination. JEL classi cation: C62, C73, D83. Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning
منابع مشابه
Strategic Asymmetry in Dynamic Coordination Games with Learning
This paper studies a simple model of dynamic coordination with learning under incomplete information. We show that strategic asymmetry arises where the predecessor’s strategy is a strategic substitute for the successor’s while the latter is a strategic complement for the former. The role of dynamics and learning is identified by comparing the strategic interactions in the coordination games wit...
متن کاملStrategic Evaluation of Sustainable Projects based on Hybrid Group Decision Analysis with Incomplete Information
– Sustainable evaluation of construction projects in strategy-focused condition is the main issue for municipalities to appropriately improve public sector services. In this respect, the group decision-making methods could help experts to select suitable sustainable projects and to schedule them regarding their ranking results. Therefore, the objective of this study is to present a hybrid group...
متن کاملIncomplete Information and Strategic Learning in Technology Adoption and Diffusion
We study an incomplete information dynamic game of a finite number of agents adopting a new technology with pure information externalities. Each agent has private information about his idiosyncratic adoption cost, but shares the same public information released by early adopters about the technology’s efficiency. We show that a unique symmetric pure strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists....
متن کاملSocial Learning with Payoff Complementarities∗
We incorporate strategic complementarities into a multi-agent sequential choice model with observable actions and private information. In this framework agents are concerned with learning from predecessors, signalling to successors, and coordinating their actions with those of others. Coordination problems have hitherto been studied using static coordination games which do not allow for learnin...
متن کاملEnsemble-based Top-k Recommender System Considering Incomplete Data
Recommender systems have been widely used in e-commerce applications. They are a subclass of information filtering system, used to either predict whether a user will prefer an item (prediction problem) or identify a set of k items that will be user-interest (Top-k recommendation problem). Demanding sufficient ratings to make robust predictions and suggesting qualified recommendations are two si...
متن کامل