Cooperation in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Perturbed Payoffs∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We examine a variant of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma whose stage game payoffs are subject to vary, and show that a payoff perturbation may strictly reduce the minimum discount factor to sustain mutual cooperation. JEL classification: C 73
منابع مشابه
The Impossibility of Cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma Games under Local Interaction and Imitation
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