Employment and Adverse Selection in Health Insurance

نویسندگان

  • Jayanta Bhattacharya
  • William B. Vogt
چکیده

We thank the ERIU for grant support. In addition, we thank participants at two ERIU conferences and at the November 2003 NBER health care program meeting for their comments. All errors remain the authors'.

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Instructions for use Title

This paper studies the effects of unemployment policies in a simple static general equilibrium model with adverse selection in the labor market. Firms offer a contract that induces the selfselection of workers. In equilibrium, all unskilled workers are screened out and some skilled workers are rationed out. It is shown that the provision of unemployment insurance (UI) raises involuntary unemplo...

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تاریخ انتشار 2004