Employment and Adverse Selection in Health Insurance
نویسندگان
چکیده
We thank the ERIU for grant support. In addition, we thank participants at two ERIU conferences and at the November 2003 NBER health care program meeting for their comments. All errors remain the authors'.
منابع مشابه
The Effect of Supplementary Health Insurance on Out-of-Pocket Payments for Elderly Households in Urban Areas of Iran: Heckman Selection Model
Objectives: Considering the growth of the elderly population and the need of the elderly for health services and the importance of supplementary insurance on improving the quality of life of the elderly households, this study aimed to investigate the effect of supplementary health insurance on out-of-pocket payments for elderly households in urban areas of Iran. Methods: this descriptive-analy...
متن کاملEconomic Research Initiative on the Uninsured Working Paper Series EMPLOYMENT AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN HEALTH INSURANCE
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متن کاملInstructions for use Title
This paper studies the effects of unemployment policies in a simple static general equilibrium model with adverse selection in the labor market. Firms offer a contract that induces the selfselection of workers. In equilibrium, all unskilled workers are screened out and some skilled workers are rationed out. It is shown that the provision of unemployment insurance (UI) raises involuntary unemplo...
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تاریخ انتشار 2004