Safety criteria in atomic energy.

The Problem The previous conference of this society dealt with the concept of tolerance levels in industrial activities. Today's conference has shown the importance of this concept in a new industry-that of atomic energy. The industry has an unfortunate history arising from its war-like introduction at Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and this has led to a considerable amount of confused thinking. Whenever atomic energy is mentioned, fear of an atomic explosion and the fear of death from a new cause are probably uppermost in men's minds. The thesis I wish to put forward is not related solely to atomic energy, but deals with the more general problems of an approach to safety standards or tolerance levels. This subject is essentially one which is linked closely to the emotions rather than to the intellect, and it would be unfortunate if the association with atomic energy aroused emotion to such an extent that we could no longer think logically of the problems. It has been stated that we should not be satisfied with our present achievement of safety in industry, nor should we be satisfied to remain just within tolerance levels laid down, but we should strive to reduce the hazard to zero. If this is the declared policy of the B.O.H.S., and is promulgated without qualification, what terms of reference do you give to those responsible for safety in a new industry ? Is the policy to be followed regardless of cost? Can the nation pay any price to ensure a marginal reduction of hazard? These are some of the questions raised by the proposition that industry should never be satisfied with an achievement in safety at any level, and must be answered if industry is rightly regarded as only one part of national activity. The Varied Incidence of Accidents in Industry Hazards in industry are extremely varied; for convenience in analysis they can be divided into a large number of categories, some giving rise to disease or ill-health in varying degree, others to accident or death. Some are easier to control or more easily anticipated than others, but fundamentally the sum total represents the hazard appropriate to a particular industry. The reduction of the hazard may be brought about by the design of better equipment, by the adoption of new processes, or by better management exercised through staff selection, control, job planning. If unlimited resources are available any one of the hazards, and consequently the total, can be reduced. I would expect to find that all industry had about the same accident rate, or that in industries showing higher than average figures the investment towards its reduction would be greater than the average. I find, in fact, a wide range of accident figures, and the difficulty in comparison arises from the definition of " accident". If this is based on time lost, other sociological factors would be introduced, such as the earnings in the industry, its past history, facilities immediately available, the goodwill of the industry. A measure of hazard which has a more precise meaning may be taken from the number of accidental deaths, and these cover a range of 30: 1 as between the highest and lowest given in the industrial classification for 1950. For every 100,000 employed in any one industry, the safe occupations showed a death rate of about 3 per annum, whereas mines and quarries showed a rate of 80 per annum. A large number of our industries have a rate of 8 to 12 per annum, that is 1 in 10,000. I am amazed at this diversity of risk, this inequality between the good and the bad, and in the light of the industrial safety policy declared earlier, I should expect to see an enormous effort applied to the reduction of risk in occupations showing the highest incidence.