How to Demonstrate Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Demonstrating the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss three different approaches to proof or check such property in regard of a multi-attribute auction mechanism: by analyzing well-known sufficient conditions, by mathematical analyzing the rules that govern the mechanism, and by empirically checking the mechanism. Particularly, for dealing with the second approach, we propose a new method which consists on seeking for a counterexample with a constraint solver.
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