Side channels attacks in code-based cryptography
نویسندگان
چکیده
The McEliece and the Niederreiter public key cryptosystems (PKC) are supposed secure in a post quantum world [4] because there is no e cient quantum algorithm for the underlying problems upon which these cryptosystems are built. The CFS, Stern and KKS signature schemes are post-quantum secure because they are based on hard problems of coding theory. The purpose of this article is to describe what kind of attacks have been proposed against code-based constructions and what is missing.
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