Situated Action: A Neuropsychologiwl Interpretation Response to Vera and Simon WILLIAM

Situated cognition research rejects the hypothesis that neurological structures and processes are similar in kind to the symbols we create and use in our everyday lives. The symbolic approach, as described by Vera and Simon (1993), conflates neurological stmctures and processes with physical representations that we perceive and manipulate in our environment (e.g., a journal article) and experiences of representing in our imagination (e.g., visualizing or talking to ourselves). This category error distorts the nature of perception, the nature of conceptual interpretation as we comprehend written plans, and in general the adaptive nature of every thought and action. At its heart, the symbolic approach confuses an agent's deliberated actionin sequences of behavior over time, as cycles of reperceiving and commenting (e.g., in speech, writing, drawing)-with what occurs within every ongoing coordination (Dewey, 1896/198 la). Put another way, the symbolic approach conflates "first-person" representations in our environment (e.g., utterances and drawings) with "thirdperson" representations (e.g., mappings a neurobiologist finds between